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WILL THE FEDERAL INSURANCE OFFICE IMPROVE
INSURANCE REGULATION?
Elizabeth F. Brown

Prior to the financial crisis, insurance was the only financial service
that did not have a federal regulator but relied almost exclusively on
state insurance regulators. The Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank Act) began a process to address
this lack of federal oversight by creating the Federal Insurance Office
(FIO) within the U.S. Treasury Department. Before the crisis, state
regulation of insurance was sharply criticized for its lack of uniformity,
its inefficiency, and the impediments that it posed for developing
international insurance norms. In the wake of the financial crisis,
questions have also been raised about whether state insurance
regulation was equipped to deal with the potential systemic risks posed
by the insurance firms, like American Insurance Group, Inc.
The Dodd–Frank Act contains provisions that begin to tackle each of
these issues, primarily through the creation of FIO. This Article will
look at the creation of FIO and the role that FIO is playing to address
the systemic risks posed by insurance and insurance-like products and
firms and the development of insurance norms. This Article will also
examine the arguments raised by many within the insurance industry
that greater federal oversight of insurance is unnecessary because the
state regulation already provided adequate solvency protections,
insurance companies do not pose the types of systemic risks posed by
banks and investment firms, and market discipline is stronger in the
insurance industry than in the banking industry.
I. INTRODUCTION
Setting aside the spectacular failure of American International Group,
Inc. (AIG), insurance is the financial services sector that seems to have
 Assistant Professor, Department of Risk Management and Insurance, Georgia State
University, B.A. 1985, College of William and Mary; M.A. 1987, Johns Hopkins University Nitze
School of Advanced International Studies; J.D. 1994, University of Chicago School of Law. E-mail:
ebrown49@gsu.edu. The author gratefully acknowledges the helpful comments of the participants at
the University of Cincinnati College of Law’s 25th Annual Corporate Law Center Symposium on
Implementing the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act on Mar. 29, 2012 and
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performed the best during the financial crisis in terms of having the
fewest number of firms that accepted some form of government bailout
and the fewest number of firms that became insolvent.1 The sheer size
of the bailout for AIG, which received $182 billion in assistance from
the U.S. Treasury and the Federal Reserve, however, led to calls for
rethinking the way that insurance is regulated within the United States.2
The United States is the only major industrial nation that lacks a national
insurance regulator. Prior to the crisis, the variety, complexity, and
expense of the state insurance regulatory structure had prompted calls
for the modernization of insurance regulation, which usually referred to
proposals to adopt uniform, national standards for insurance or to create
an optional federal charter for insurance that would preempt most state
insurance regulation.3 In the wake of the crisis, some government
officials, industry representatives, and academics have raised additional
questions about the role that the fragmentary state insurance regulatory
regime played and the need for more national or international insurance
regulation to deal with systemic risks.4

1. Only three insurance companies received aid from the federal government—AIG, Hartford
Financial Services, and Lincoln National Corporation. Bailout Recipients, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 19,
2012), http://projects.propublica.org/bailout/list. Only eighteen insurers became insolvent in 2009,
compared to 140 banks. Insurance Oversight and Legislative Proposals: Hearing Before the H.
Subcomm. on Ins., Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs, 112th Cong. 2 (2011)
(statement of Joseph Torti, III, Deputy Director of the National Association of Insurance Commissioners
(NAIC) and Superintendent of Insurance and Banking, Rhode Island Department of Business
Regulation) [hereinafter Torti].
2. David
Goldman,
CNNMoney.com’s
Bailout
Tracker,
CNNMoney,
http://money.cnn.com/news/storysupplement/economy/bailouttracker/#AIG (last visited Apr. 30, 2013)
(itemizing the $182 billion committed by various federal government programs to bailout AIG); U.S.
DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM—A NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING
FINANCIAL
SUPERVISION
AND
REGULATION
39–41
(2009),
available
at
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport_web.pdf [hereinafter OBAMA WHITE PAPER]
(calls for enhanced oversight of insurance sector).
3. Congress considered several draft bills between 2000 and 2007, including the Insurance
Consumer Protection Act of 2003, three versions of the National Insurance Act, and the State
Modernization and Regulatory Transparency Act. Insurance Consumer Protection Act of 2003, S. 1373,
108th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 8, 2003) (optional federal charter); National Insurance Act of 2006, S. 2509,
109th Cong., 2d Sess. (Apr. 5, 2006) (optional federal charter); National Insurance Act of 2007, S. 40,
110th Cong., 1st Sess. (May 24, 2007) (optional federal charter); National Insurance Act of 2007, H.R.
3200, 110th Cong., 1st Sess (July 25, 2007) (optional federal charter); and State Modernization and
Regulatory Transparency Act, Staff Discussion Draft (Aug. 18, 2004) [hereinafter SMART ACT] (would
have imposed uniform laws on states).
4. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY BLUEPRINT
FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE (2008) [hereinafter PAULSON TREASURY
BLUEPRINT]; OBAMA WHITE PAPER, supra note 2; Committee on Cap. Mkts. Reg., THE GLOBAL
FINANCIAL CRISIS—A PLAN FOR REGULATORY REFORM (May 2009), available at
http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/TGFC-CCMR_Report_%285-26-09%29.pdf; Elizabeth F. Brown, A
Comparison of the Handling of the Financial Crisis in the United States, the United Kingdom, and
Australia, 55 VILLANOVA L. REV. 509, 574–75 (2010); Walter W. Eubanks, Federal Financial Services
Regulatory Consolidation: Structural Response to the 2007–2009 Financial Crisis (Apr. 10, 2010),
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State insurance regulators and officials within the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), a voluntary body
comprised of the insurance commissioners from all of the states, the
District of Columbia, and the U.S. territories, have attempted to push
back against the movement for federal regulation by arguing that it is
unnecessary.5 They have repeatedly pointed out that AIG was brought
down by its Financial Products division in London, which had issued a
large number of credit default swaps (CDSs) that were not classified as
insurance products and, thus were not subject to the regulatory oversight
of state insurance regulators.6
NAIC and other proponents of these views gloss over two facts.
First, they ignore the fact that the insurance companies, including
insurance subsidiaries, also actively participated in the derivatives
markets, including CDSs.7 Second, they also ignore the fact that NAIC,
at least for a time, thought that certain types of derivatives, which
competed directly with traditional insurance products, should have been
classified as insurance and regulated as insurance.8 In 2000, New York
available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41176_20100412.pdf; Adrianne Fresh & Martin Neil
Bailey, What Does International Experience Tell us About Regulatory Competition?, Pew Econ. Dept.
Fin.
Reform
Project,
Briefing
Paper
No.
6
(2009),
available
at
http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/Policy%20page/Fresh-Baily-International-Final-TF-Correction.pdf;
Howell E. Jackson, A Pragmatic Approach to Phased Consolidation of Financial Services Regulation in
the United States (Oct. 2008), available at http://www2.lse.ac.uk/fmg/documents/specialPapers/2008/s
p184.pdf; Investment Co. Inst., FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATORY REFORM: DISCUSSION AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (Mar. 3, 2009), available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/ppr_09_reg_reform.pdf;
Sabrina R. Pellerin, John R. Walter, and Patricia E. Wescott, The Consolidation of Financial Market
Regulation: Pros, Cons, and Implications for the United States, Fed. Res. Bank of Richmond Working
Paper Series No. 09-08 (May 2009), available at http://richmondfed.org/publications/research/working
_papers/2009/pdf/wp09-8.pdf.
5. Torti, supra note 1, at App. A, B; GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., INSURANCE RECIPROCITY
AND UNIFORMITY, GAO Rept. GOA-09-372 (Apr. 2009) [hereinafter GAO 2009 INSURANCE RPT.] at
App. II: Comments from the National Association of Commissioners.
6. In response to a 2009 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report that was criticial of
the states’ and NAIC’s efforts to improve regulatory uniformity in the areas of producer licensing,
product approval, and market conduct rules, Andrew Beal, NAIC’s Chief Operating Officer and Chief
Legal Officer, commented:
The report refers to AIG as ‘one of our nation’s largest insurers’ and attributes some
concern about oversight of the insurance industry to AIG’s financial difficulties. In fact,
AIG is a global financial services conglomerate that does business in 130 countries. AIG
owns 176 other companies, in addition, to 71 U.S. state-regulated insurance subsidiaries.
AIG’s insurance companies remain solvent, in part, because state regulation continues to
wall them off from the high-risk credit default swap activities engaged in by AIG
Financial Products. AIG’s Financial Products operation—created a systemic risk
causing the federal government to intercede.
GAO 2009 INSURANCE RPT., supra note 5, at 45.
7. See Mary Williams Walsh, Trading Risk Wasn’t Just on the Fringe at A.I.G., N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 1, 2010) (noting that insurers were the third biggest issuers of CDSs and Alico, a subsidiary of
AIG, was heavily involved in issuing CDSs).
8. See discussion infra Part I(B)(4) and accompanying notes.
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decided not to classify CDSs as insurance products and other states
followed suit.9
Regulatory arbitrage and agency capture probably played a role in
why U.S. state insurance regulators chose not to classify these products
as insurance. Without an international agreement on how to regulate
CDSs, the U.S. state regulators faced the real possibility that strict
regulations in the United States would simply lead financial firms to
move their CDS businesses offshore to the United Kingdom or other
jurisdictions with more permissive regulatory environments. Prior to the
New York decision, the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association (ISDA), a trade association for financial firms involved in
derivatives trades, obtained a legal opinion from Robin Potts, QC, an
English barrister, that argued that CDSs should not be treated as
insurance products.10
The decision by New York not to regulate CDSs as insurance
products combined with the exemption from regulation by the federal
authorities under the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 200011
(CFMA) created a regulatory hole that allowed these products to make
significant contribution to the financial crisis. This regulatory gap also
has allowed the existing financial services regulators at both the federal
and state level to point fingers and attempt to push the blame for the
havoc that these instruments caused onto the other players in the
government.
In many ways, the regulation, or lack thereof, for CDSs illustrates
many of the problems, both domestic and international, that led to the
creation of the Federal Insurance Office (FIO) in the Dodd–Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd–Frank Act).12 This
Article analyzes to what extent FIO can address these problems.
The first part of this Article will discuss in more depth the problems
with U.S. insurance regulation and the process that led to the creation of
FIO. The second part will discuss how the Dodd–Frank Act attempted
to address these problems by the creation of FIO.
The third part will discuss the factors that are possibly shaping FIO’s
long delayed report on how to modernize insurance regulation and what
its likely proposals will be. FIO’s report on how to modernize insurance
regulation was due in January 2012 under the terms of the Dodd–Frank

9. N.Y. Dep’t of Ins., Op. Re: Credit Default Option Facility, 2000 NY Insurance GC Opinions
LEXIS 144 (2000).
10. Arthur Kimball-Stanley, Insurance and Credit Default Swaps: Should Like Things Be
Treated Alike?, 15 CONN. INS. L. J. 241, 246–47 (2008).
11. See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2 (2000)).
12. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (to be codified as scattered sections of 12, 15
U.S.C.) [hereinafter DODD–FRANK ACT].
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Act.13 In March 2013, FIO’s director announced that the report would
finally be released before July 2013.14
Given the intense lobbying by the insurance industry, the fact that
FIO’s initial director has shown little interest in having the federal
government displace the states as the primarily regulator of insurance,
the dominance of state regulators and industry officials with vested
interests in maintaining the status quo on FIO’s advisory committee, and
the fact that neither Congress nor the President are prepared to
undertake drastic reforms in the area of financial services given the
current budget battles, it is likely that FIO’s report will only propose
modest, incremental changes to the present regulatory structure.15
Nevertheless, by giving the federal government the power to negotiate
international agreements on insurance prudential standards and by
creating FIO, whose mere existence will put pressure on the states to
work harder on efforts to make insurance regulation more uniform and
less duplicative, the Dodd–Frank Act has established mechanisms for
improving insurance regulation both domestically and internationally.
II. PRE-CRISIS INSURANCE REGULATION
Insurance, unlike banking or securities, has never had a major federal
regulator. To understand why, one needs to understand the history of
how insurance regulation developed in the United States. Three factors
explain the development of U.S. insurance regulations: the U.S.
Supreme Court’s flip-flopping on whether “insurance” was interstate
commerce, the lack of a large enough crisis in the insurance industry to
convince Congress of the need for federal regulation, and the efforts of
the states to remain the sole regulators of insurance.
A. History of U.S. State Regulation of Insurance
For most of the history of the United States, state and federal
regulators have regulated financial services primarily based on the
institution providing the financial service or product. This type of
regulation is referred to as institutional regulation.
The states
established separate regulators to regulate first banks, then insurance
companies, and later securities firms.

13. 31 U.S.C. § 313(p)(1) (2012).
14. Mark A. Hoffman, Federal Insurance Office Reports to Be Released in Summer: McRaith,
BUSINESS INSURANCE (Mar. 13, 2013),
http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20130313/NEWS04/130319929?tags=|59|306|76|73|80.
15. See discussion infra Part III and accompanying notes.
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States began regulating insurance during the latter half of the 1800s.16
The first state board established to regulate insurance was the New
Hampshire Board of Insurance Commissioners formed in 1851.17 State
insurance regulation during this period was not exactly effective due, in
part, to the fact that many administrators were either corrupt,
halfhearted, or inept.18 In addition, no coherent economic theory
underlay most insurance regulation. Instead, most regulations were a
product of interest group politics and fears on the part of policyholders
concerning the economic power of the insurance companies and a belief
that such companies were out to defraud the public.19
State regulations have never been completely consistent or uniform.
In fact, as the insurance companies expanded across state lines, some
within the industry sought federal regulation as a means of supplanting
the burden of complying with different state regulations.20 Some
insurance firms presumed that federal regulation would be weaker than
the existing state regulations.21 The decision of the U.S. Supreme Court
in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 169 (1868), ended any movement towards
federal regulation when it held that “[i]ssuing a policy of insurance
[was] not a transaction of commerce” and, therefore, the federal
government lacked the power to regulate insurance under the Commerce
Clause.22
In 1944, however, the U.S. Supreme Court in United States v. SouthEastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944), reversed its earlier
decision in Paul v. Virginia. This time the U.S. Supreme Court held that
insurance did constitute interstate commerce and was subject to federal
regulation under the Commerce Clause.23
In spite of the decision in South-Eastern Underwriters, insurance was
the only area of the financial services industry that did not come under
at least partial federal regulation as part of the New Deal.24 This
circumstance was due largely to the efforts of NAIC. NAIC viewed the
16. Susan Randall, Insurance Regulation in the United States: Regulatory Federalism and the
National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 26 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 625, 630 (1999). Many of the
first commissions were not independent agencies or entities, but were instead comprised of other state
officials with other duties. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 332 (3rd ed.
2005).
17. Randall, supra note 16, at 630 n.18.
18. FRIEDMAN, supra note 16, at 332–33.
19. Id. at 444.
20. Randall, supra note 16, at 630.
21. Id.
22. Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183 (1868).
23. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 552–53 (1944).
24. SHEILA BAIR, CONSUMER RAMIFICATIONS OF AN OPTIONAL FEDERAL CHARTER FOR LIFE
INSURERS 6–9 (2004), available at http://vote.ebaymainstreet.com/afc/UMass_Report.pdf; Randall,
supra note 16, at 633.
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decision in South-Eastern Underwriters as an assault on the states’
power to regulate insurance and proposed a bill to reserve the power to
regulate insurance to the states.25 Congress enacted NAIC’s bill in 1945
as the McCarran–Ferguson Act,26 which stated that federal law would
not regulate insurance activities, provided that those activities were
related to the “business of insurance,” were regulated by the state law,
and were not designed to intimidate, coerce, or boycott.27 NAIC drafted
model laws governing insurance with the All-Industry Committee, a
group of insurance industry representatives organized by NAIC, and
worked to see that most of the states had adopted these laws by the early
1950s.28
In 1999, Congress enacted the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act (GLBA),29
which repealed portions of the Glass–Steagall Act of 1933,30 the Bank
Holding Company Act of 1956 (BHCA),31 and other laws in order to
permit banks, securities firms, insurance companies, and other entities
engaged in the provision of financial services to become affiliated with
one another in order to form financial conglomerates32 that would enable
them to cross sell each other’s products and services. GLBA attempted
to move away from institutional regulation towards functional regulation
and encouraged the dismantling of the barriers between banks, securities
firms, and insurance companies that had already begun to take place
through rulemaking by the existing state and federal financial service
regulatory agencies.33 Under GLBA, Congress, however, left insurance
25. Randall, supra. note 16, at 633.
26. Ch. 20, § 1, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1011 (2012)).
27. Id.; Randall, supra note 16, at 633–34.
28. Id. at 634.
29. Pub. L. No. 106-102, § 1, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified in scattered sections of 12, 15, 16,
18 U.S.C.).
30. The Glass–Steagall Act is the name given to four sections of the Banking Act of 1933, Ch.
89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933). GLBA repealed Section 20 of Glass–Steagall, which prevented any Federal
Reserve member bank from being affiliated with an entity principally engaged in securities and Section
33, which banned interlocking managements between Federal Reserve member banks and securities
firms. GLBA, 12 U.S.C. § 377(a), 12 U.S.C. § 78(b) (2010).
31. Ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (1956) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841–49).
32. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the Joint Forum on Financial
Conglomerates defines financial conglomerates as “any group of companies under common control
whose exclusive or predominant activities consist of providing significant services in at least two
different financial sectors.” TRIPARTITE GRP. OF BANK, SEC., AND INS. REGULATORS, THE
SUPERVISION OF FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES ¶ 36 (July 1995), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs20.pdf. This Article will use this definition when referring to financial
conglomerates. Financial conglomerates are distinguishable from “mixed conglomerates,” in which
groups of commercial or industrial enterprises include a financial institution as part of their structure.
Id. While mixed conglomerates may raise some of the same regulatory and supervisory issues as
financial conglomerates, such concerns are beyond the scope of this article.
33. Functional regulation focuses on the products or services being offered rather than the
institution offering them to determine which regulator ought to regulate the products or services. For
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regulation primarily in the hands of the state insurance commissions.34
GLBA did require that a majority of states had to adopt either
uniform or reciprocal requirements for licensing of insurance agents or a
new entity, the National Association of Registered Agents and Brokers
(NARAB), would be created to handle licensing for insurance agents.35
Perhaps not surprising, when given a choice between reciprocity and
uniformity, the states chose reciprocity over uniformity.36 Reciprocity
only required that states accept the licensing decisions of other states,
even though their requirements might be different, while uniformity
would have required the same set of requirements to be applied by the
states. By 2008, NAIC had certified forty-three states as meeting the
reciprocity requirements under GLBA with four more agreeing to do so
by 2009.37 Nevertheless, major states, like California, New York, and
Florida, still have not complied with the reciprocity requirements.38
GLBA did not require state laws to be updated to deal with the new
financial conglomerates created in the wake of GLBA’s enactment.
Generally, state insurance laws only allow the state to regulate noninsurance entities that form part of a conglomerate if they threaten the
solvency of the insurance entities within the group.39 The drafters of

example, under GLBA, Congress envisioned the SEC regulating investments in securities regardless of
whether the investment services were offered through a bank or through an independent brokerage firm.
Under the institutional regulatory regime, banking regulators traditionally regulated securities offered
through banks. Originally, sections 3(a)(4) and 3(a)(5) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 excluded
banks from the definitions of broker and dealer and left the regulation of banks engaging in securities
activities to the banking regulators. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78c (a)(4), (a)(5) (2010). GLBA amended those
sections to eliminate the exception for banks. 15 U.S.C. § 78c. If a bank’s securities activities do not
fall into one of the other categories of permissible bank securities activities set forth in GLBA, then the
bank is required to transfer those broker–dealer activities to an affiliated broker–dealer.
34. 15 U.S.C. § 6701. GLBA did put a few limitations on the otherwise unfettered ability of the
states to regulate insurance. For example, GLBA § 104(c) prohibits states from preventing or restricting
a depository institution or an affiliate of such institution from being affiliated with any person except in
certain limited circumstances related to insurers. Id. § 6701(c)(1). Prior to GLBA’s enactment, nine
states and territories prohibited banks from affiliating with insurance companies. CONFERENCE OF
STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, A PROFILE OF STATE-CHARTERED BANKING 117–19 (17th ed. 1998).
Those states were Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, New York, Puerto Rico, Tennessee, Vermont,
and West Virginia. Id.
35. 15 U.S.C. § 6751 (2010).
36. State Insurance Regulation: Efforts to Streamline Key Licensing and Approval Processes
Face Challenges: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins. and Gov’t Sponsored
Enters.of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 107th Cong. (2002) (statement of Richard J. Hillman, Director,
Financial Markets and Community Investment, General Accounting Office) [hereinafter Hillman].
37. NAIC Producer Licensing Assessment Aggregate Report of Findings (February 19, 2008),
http://www.naic.org/documents/committees_ex_pltf_plwg_PLC_assessment_aggregate_report.pdf
[hereinafter NAIC PRODUCER LICENSING ASSESSMENT]; Shanique Hall, Producer Licensing and
NARAB II, CIPR NEWSLETTER (Apr. 2012), at n.23, http://www.naic.org/cipr_newsletter_archive/vol3
_prod_licensing_narab2.htm.
38. Id. at 2 n.1.
39. See, e.g., CA Ins. Code § 1215.7(b) (examinations of affiliates done through a supervisory
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GLBA expected the new financial conglomerates to become financial
holding companies (FHCs). The provisions of GLBA, however, did not
require them to become FHCs, only allowed them to do so under certain
conditions.40 GLBA designated the Federal Reserve, which supervises
bank holding companies (BHCs), to become the supervisor for the
FHCs.41 The financial subsidiaries of the FHCs would continue to be
regulated by the relevant authority for their product or service.42
The vast majority of the companies that registered as FHCs before the
financial crisis had previously been BHCs.43 Only a few insurance firms
that had not previously been affiliated with a commercial bank elected
to become FHCs after GLBA’s enactment and before the financial
crisis.44 MetLife fell into this category.45 Many of the largest financial
conglomerates with substantial insurance businesses, like AIG, did not
register as FHCs.46 The GLBA and the BHCA did not require them to

college comprised of state, federal, and international regulators); N.Y. Code § 1504 (holding company
examinations permitted only if the holding company’s operations are deemed to materially impact an
insurance company). The differences between how the United States and Europe regulate financial
conglomerates with insurance affiliates continues to be a source of international conflict. See Louie
Woodall, Group Supervision and Solvency Vex US and EU Regulatory Talks, RISK.NET (Mar. 18, 2013)
(discussing differences in group supervision).
40. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(k) (1999).
41. Id.
42. Id. For example, an insurance company owned by a FHC would still be subject to regulation
by the state insurance regulators.
43. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS. AND U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT
TO THE CONGRESS ON FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANIES UNDER THE GRAMM–LEACH–BLILEY ACT 3
(2003).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Financial Holding Companies, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS. (Aug. 6, 2004) (on file
with the author) [hereinafter PRE-CRISIS FHCS]. In fact, only six of the top twenty-five largest U.S.
financial services firms by revenue in 2006 were registered as FHCs. See PRE-CRISIS FHC; INS. INFO.
INSTITUTE. AND & THE FIN. SERVICES ROUNDTABLE, THE FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2008 9
(2008) [hereinafter FACT BOOK 2008]. Of the twenty-five largest U.S. financial services firms by
revenue in 2006, Fortune classified eleven of them as insurance firms but only one of these insurance
firms, MetLife, was registered as a FHC. PRE-CRISIS FHCS, supra; FACT BOOK 2008, supra, at 9.
Steve Bartlett, the President and Chief Executive Officer of the Financial Services Roundtable,
commented in his testimony before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs on
July 13, 2004:
One of the central features of GLBA was the creation of financial holding
companies . . . The financial holding company structure significantly expanded the scope
of activities permissible for banking firms; it did not offer insurance firms and securities
firms a similar benefit. Outside of the financial holding company structure, securities
and insurance firms are subject to few limitations on affiliations. Thus, it is not
surprising that only a handful of securities and insurance firms have become financial
holding companies.
Examination of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act Five Years After Its Passage: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous. and Urban Affairs of the H. Comm. On Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. 69 (2004)
(statement of Steve Bartlett, President and Chief Executive Officer, Financial Services Roundtable).
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register as FHCs or BHCs because they did not own a bank, although
they usually owned another type of depository institution, such as a
savings and loan company.47
B. Problems with State Regulation of Insurance
Prior to the financial crisis, five major problems existed that
prompted calls for federal regulation of insurance. These problems
included: (1) regulations that sometimes lacked uniformity and at other
times were duplicative, (2) long time commitments for insurance
providers to obtain regulatory approvals for new products and firms, (3)
significant compliance costs for insurance providers, (4) regulatory gaps
created by hybrid products that allowed regulatory arbitrage, and (5) the
hindrance of the establishment of international standards, which created
opportunities for international regulatory arbitrage.
1. State Insurance Regulations Lack Uniformity and Are Sometimes
Duplicative
In order to offer a new product in all fifty states and the District of
Columbia, a financial firm must determine if this product meets the
definition of insurance in all of those jurisdictions.48 Determining
whether this new product qualifies as insurance in all fifty states is not
an easy process because no clear, universally accepted definition for
insurance exists. Several states do not even try to define insurance
within their statutes.49 In those states, one must look to state common
law for how the courts have defined insurance.50
47. As mentioned in note 46, eleven of the twenty-five largest U.S. financial services firms by
revenue in 2006 were insurance firms. Seven of those insurance firms owned thrifts, which are more
commonly known as savings and loan companies, and several of them would become targets for
increased oversight by the Federal Reserve following the crisis. FACT BOOK 2008, supra note 46, at 9;
The Allstate Corporation, Annual Report, (Form 10-K) (Feb. 21, 2007), at 14; Arthur D. Postal,
Hartford Agrees to Sell Thrift, LifeHealthPro (May 23, 2011), http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2011/05/
23/hartford-agrees-to-sell-thrift; Elizabeth D. Festa & Arthur D. Postal, The Fed’s Hit List,
LIFEHEALTHPRO (May 2, 2012), http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2012/05/02/the-feds-hit-list.
48. This problem is illustrated by the problems that arose in getting a new product, home equity
insurance, approved in New York. Andrew Caplin et al, HOME EQUITY INSURANCE: A PILOT PROJECT
(Yale Int’l Ctr. For Fin. Working Paper No. 03-12, 2003) at 24–28. New York ultimately concluded
that home equity insurance was not insurance as New York defined it and so did not need to be licensed
as such in New York. New York’s approach differed from those adopted in California and Illinios. Id.
at 5–7. Because insurance is regulated at the state level, insurance firms need approvals from each state
in which they want to offer a completely new product. To offer a new product in all fifty states, requires
going through fifty approval processes similar to the one that home equity insurance went through in the
state of New York.
49. See APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE 2D § 1.03 (2007).
50. Id.
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If the firm determines that some states will consider the product to be
insurance, then it must contend with a confusing series of licensing and
post-licensing requirements for both the firm offering the product and
for the product. The exact type of license required varies from state to
state. Some states issue a general insurance producer license, which
allows an individual or an entity to sell several insurance services, while
others issue separate licenses for agents and brokers or issue separate
licenses for each insurance line.51
In addition to requiring different types of licenses, states require
potential new insurance producers to fulfill a range of requirements
when completing their applications. In some cases, these variations
among the states’ applications are due to important differences on policy
questions but in others, the requirements seem to lack any rationale or
policy justification.52
As noted in Part I(A) above, since 2009, forty-seven states do grant
some form of reciprocity if a company has been granted a license in
another state.53 The introduction and passage by the U.S. House of
Representatives of the National Association of Registered Agents and
Brokers Reform Act of 2008 may have spurred a few of the states to
agree to reciprocity.54 The 2008 bill called for the creation of the
NARAB, which was originally proposed in GLBA. As in GLBA,
NARAB in the 2008 bill would have acted as a clearinghouse through
which insurance producers would be allowed to provide insurance in
states other than their home state without having to apply for a nonresident license as long as they paid the non-resident licensing fees. The
Senate never passed a related bill and so the legislation went nowhere.
A few states with major markets, like California, Florida, and New
York, still have not signed on to these reciprocity agreements because of
concerns that the licensing requirement in other states do not adequately

51. See NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, 2011 INSURANCE DEPARTMENT RESOURCES REPORT
(2011) [hereinafter NAIC 2011 REPORT]. NAIC defines “producer” as a person or entity “[l]icensed to
offer several insurance services.” Id. In most cases, a producer will be a company, rather than an
individual.
52. For example, New York and California require criminal background checks before allowing
a person to sell insurance within their borders because they are trying to deter fraud, but some states do
not require such checks. See Hillman, supra note 36, at 5. Other states, like Kentucky and Ohio,
reportedly would return filings if they had been stapled improperly, which hardly seems like an
important policy rationale. Andrew G. Simpson, Leave-No-State-Regulation-Behind, INS. J. (Sept. 6,
2004), http://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/editorsnote/2004/09/06/45946.htm.
53. NAIC PRODUCER LICENSING ASSESSMENT, supra note 37, at 2 n.1 and Exhibits A, C, and D;
Hall, supra note 37, at n.2.
54. National Association of Registered Agents and Brokers Reform Act of 2008, H.R. 5611,
110th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Sept. 22, 2008), http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr5611/text;
govTrack.com, H.R. 5611: National Association of Registered Agents and Brokers Reform Act of 2008,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/110/hr5611 [hereinafter govTrack.com NARAB 2008].
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protect consumers.55 For example, they continue to object to the
absence of any requirement in NAIC’s Producer Licensing Model Act
(PLMA) that all criminal background checks include fingerprint
identification.56 They feel such a requirement is essential to protect the
consumers in their states from fraud by criminals who might evade
detection if fingerprint identification is not done. In addition, the
reciprocity arrangements of the other forty-seven states do not cover
post-licensing requirements, which are also at times inconsistent and
duplicative.57
The process became easier for life insurance, annuities, disability
income, and long-term care insurance because the Interstate Insurance
Product Regulation Commission (IIPRC) began operating on June 2,
2007 and covers these products.58 The Interstate Insurance Compact,
originally proposed by NAIC, created the IIPRC.59 The IIPRC provides
a central filing point for seeking licenses for insurance products from the
states that are parties to the Interstate Insurance Compact.60 Forty-one
states and territories are members of the IIPRC.61 Once again, the states
with the largest insurance markets, New York, California, Connecticut,
and Florida, currently are not members.62
2. State Regulations Are Time Consuming
In addition to having to complete multiple producer licensing and
product licensing applications, insurance companies complained that
having all of the state insurance regulators review and approve the
necessary applications for a new product could take up to two years.63
The state by state review of product filings persists even though the
System for Electronic Rate and Form Filing (SERFF), which NAIC

55. NAIC PRODUCER LICENSING ASSESSMENT, supra note 37, at 2 n.1; Hall, supra note 37.
56. GAO 2009 INSURANCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 14; Hall, supra note 37. The forty-seven
states that have agreed to reciprocity enacted some version of the PLMA. See Hall, supra note 37.
57. Hillman, supra note 36, at 7.
58. News Release: Interstate Insurance Compact Open for Business, INTERSTATE INS. PRODUCT
REG. COMMISSION (June 2, 2007), http://insurancecompact.org/releases/open_for_business.htm.
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. About
the
IIPRC,
INTERSTATE
INS.
PRODUCT
REG.
COMMISSION,
http://www.insurancecompact.org/about.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2013).
62. See id. Florida and New York, however, are considering legislation to become members of
the IIPRC. Id.
63. Ruth Gastel, Optional Federal Charter, INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE INSURANCE
ISSUES UPDATE (Aug. 2003); Insurance Product Approval: The Need For Modernization: Hearing
Before the H. Subcomm. on Capital Mkts., Ins., and Gov’t Sponsored Enter. of the H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 107th Cong. 13 (2001) (statement of William B. Fisher, Vice President and Associate General
Counsel, Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company).
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created in 1998, provides a uniform format for insurers to submit filings
for product approvals.64 States rely on a diverse range of procedures
when reviewing product filings and require different types of additional
documentation as part of their reviews.65
The Interstate Insurance Compact has substantially reduced these
problems for certain life, annuity, disability income, and long-term care
products by having the IIPRC approve the products, but only for the
states that are members of the Compact.66 The fact that the states with
the largest insurance markets (New York, California, and Florida) are
not members of the Compact means that delays to get approvals from
those states could still be lengthy. A 2004 study conducted by the
University of Massachusetts Isenberg School of Management found that
insurers reported that in the five largest states in which they did
business, getting a life insurance product approved took six to nine
months.67 Even for products covered by the Compact, the Compact
allows member states to make certain individualized decisions with
regard to product approvals.68
3. State Regulations Are Expensive
Insurance companies must pay a variety of fees and taxes to each of
the states in which they operate. Most states use these fees and taxes on
insurance products to cover the budgets of their insurance regulators.
The states within the United States pay in aggregate considerably more
than any other developed country to regulate insurance. With these
higher costs, it is questionable whether the United States is getting a
proportionally better regulatory regime for its money.
Looking at how much the governments in the United States, the
United Kingdom, and Germany spent in 2007 at the beginning of the
financial crisis illustrates this point. Prior to the financial crisis, the UK
Financial Services Authority (UK FSA) regularly included data on how
much certain nations spent to regulate financial services in its annual
reports.69 According to the data collected by the UK FSA for

64. GAO 2009 INSURANCE RPT., supra note 5, at 5.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. BAIR, supra note 24, at 42–43. Out of 383 companies in the life insurance business that were
sent the survey, 129 companies responded.
68. Id.
69. See, e.g., FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, ANNUAL REPORT 2007/08, 104–09 (2008)
[hereinafter UK FSA 2007/08 ANNUAL REPT.]. The UK FSA raised the following caveats regarding the
comparability of the data collected: (1) the figures do not necessarily relate to the same accounting
period and may not have been compiled on the same basis; (2) labor and other costs vary between
countries; (3) variations in exchange rates will affect the results expressed in a single currency; (4) the
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comparison with its 2007/08 fiscal year, which began on April 1, 2007
and ended on March 31, 2008, the total annual regulatory costs incurred
by the states within the United States to regulate insurance were
approximately $1.2 billion, or almost nineteen times more than the total
annual insurance regulatory costs for the UK FSA, which were $63.51
million, and about twenty-nine times more than the total annual
insurance regulatory costs for Germany’s Bundesanstalt für
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht70 (BaFin), which were $41.68 million.71
The differences in the regulatory costs cannot be accounted for solely
by the size of the insurance markets among these nations. During
roughly the same period, the total insurance premiums in the United
States equaled approximately $1.4 trillion, which was about three times
more than the $510.1 billion in total premiums in the United Kingdom
and five times more than the $267.9 billion total premiums in
Germany.72
Simply looking at the amount that the government spends to regulate
insurance underestimates the total costs to the United States of the
current regulatory regime because it does not capture how much more
companies and individuals must pay to operate within the system. The
regulatory costs are a fraction of the fees, assessments, and taxes that the
state and federal governments charge financial service firms. The total
amount budgeted for all of the state insurance commissions in 2011 was
about $1.3 billion but the total revenues collected by the state insurance
commissions in 2011 was $19.2 billion.73 In other words, only 6.7
percent of the revenues that the states collect from insurance companies
went towards insurance regulation in 2011. Most states have a
scope of the responsibility of the regulatory authorities differ from one country to the next; and (5)
material differences in the size and nature of the financial services industries in each country exist. Id.
at 105. The UK FSA stopped including such data beginning with its Annual Report 2009/10.
FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, ANNUAL REPORT 2008/09, 122–23 (2009); FINANCIAL SERVICES
AUTHORITY, ANNUAL REPORT 2009/10 (2010); FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, ANNUAL REPORT
2010/11 (2011); FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, ANNUAL REPORT 2011/12 (2012).
70. The English translation of the name for this agency is the Federal Financial Supervisory
Authority.
71. See UK FSA 2007/08 ANNUAL REPT, supra note 69, at 104–09. The amounts cited in the
original report were in pounds. For purposes of this paper, the exchange rate used to convert the
amounts cited in the UK FSA’s report back into dollars was the U.S. dollar-pound exchange rate for
Apr. 30, 2008 of $1.9847=£1. Historical Rate for the UK Pound, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES.,
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/Hist/dat00_uk.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2013) The U.S. total
cited in the report was based on information provided by NAIC. See UK FSA 2007/08 ANNUAL REPT.,
supra note 69, at 107.
72. UK FSA 2007/08 ANNUAL REPT., supra note 69, at 107. The amounts cited in the original
report were in pounds. For purposes of this paper, the exchange rate used to convert the amounts cited
in the UK FSA’s report back into dollars was the U.S. dollar–pound exchange rate for Apr. 30, 2008 of
$1.9847=£1.
Historical Rate for the UK Pound, BOARD GOVERNORS FED. RES.,
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/H10/Hist/dat00_uk.htm (last visited Apr. 30, 2013).
73. NAIC 2011 REPORT, supra note 51, at 32, 36.
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dedicated funding systems under which the fees, assessments, fines, and
penalties can only be used by the state insurance commission, but the
taxes levied on the insurance companies goes back into the states’
general funds to pay for any other state operations, such as roads and
schools.74 In 2011, $15.4 billion or over 80 percent of the revenues
generated by the states from insurance companies were from taxes,
which primarily went back into the states’ general funds to support state
operations other than insurance regulation.75
The excessive cost problem is further compounded by the fact that
most of the revenues generated by the states usually come from foreign
insurance companies. A foreign insurance company is any insurance
company that is writing insurance in a state in which it is not domiciled.
In 2011, the total number of domestic insurers (insurers domiciled in the
state in which the business is written) in the fifty states and the District
of Columbia equaled 6,296, or an average of 117 domestic insurers per
state.76 The state with the fewest number of domestic insurers in 2011
was Wyoming with five, and the state with the largest number of
domestic insurers, excluding captive insurers, in 2011 was New York
with 616.77
The number of foreign insurers is larger than the number of domestic
insurers in every state. The ratio of foreign insurers to domestic insurers
ranges from 1.8 to 1 in New York to 280 to 1 in Wyoming.78 On
average, 1,341 foreign insurers operate in each state, which means that,
on average, foreign insurers comprise a little over 90 percent of the total
number of insurers in a state.79 If one assumes that states generally
charge the same taxes, fees, assessments, fines, and penalties to foreign

74. Id. at 27, 31.
75. Id. at 31.
76. Id. at 36.
77. Id. The top five states based on the number of domestic insurers were: New York (616),
Florida (501), Texas (430), Wisconsin (390) and Illinois (358). Id. If captive insurers were included,
Vermont would have more domestic insurance companies than New York. Captive insurers are
insurance companies formed to provide insurance and risk management services to their parent
company and its affiliates. States tend to impose weaker regulations and few consumer protections on
captive insurers. Lynnley Browning, Vermont Becomes ‘Offshore’ Insurance Haven, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
4, 2007. NAIC statistics regarding domestic insurance companies used to include captive insurers.
However, when the domestic insurers included captive insurers, the number of domestic insurers in
Vermont surpassed the number in New York in 2005. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, 2004
INSURANCE DEPARTMENT RESOURCES REPORT 46 (2005) (shows New York has a total of 617 while
Vermont has 546); NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, 2005 INSURANCE DEPARTMENT RESOURCES
REPORT 46 (2006) (showes New York has a total of 559 while Vermont has a total of 567). Vermont
has made a concerted effort to market itself as a haven for captive insurance companies. Browning,
supra. The captive insurance sector is one of the ten largest employers in Vermont and the premiums
paid account for 2 percent of Vermont’s state budget. Id.
78. NAIC RESOURCES REPORT 2011, supra note 51, at 36.
79. Id.
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insurers as to domestic insurers, then states raised about $17.6 billion, or
over 90 percent of the $19.2 billion in total revenue that the states
earned from taxes, fees, assessments, fines, penalties, and other sources
from foreign insurers in 2011.80
In the 2004 study by the University of Massachusetts Isenberg School
of Management, the industry survey data showed that life insurers spent
about 65 percent of their regulatory dollars on “front-end” regulation,
presumably due to the need to deal with multiple jurisdictions in
company and producer licensing and product filings.81 In addition,
according to the respondents, the average cost per company of licensing
in an additional state was $8,673 while the average cost per fleet of
licensing in another state was $23,279.82 The average cost of producer
licensing in another state per fleet was $136 per agent, or a total of
$28,199, and per company was $36 per agent, or a total of $11,280.83
The average cost of licensing another product in another state was
$12,348 per fleet and $4,715 per company.84
The significant costs involved, both in terms of time and money, for a
company to get licensed as an insurance provider and to get its products
licensed have created substantial barriers to entry in the insurance
industry. In fact, about 66 percent of the respondents to the survey
conducted as part of the University of Massachusetts study on life
insurers considered the state regulatory structure for insurance to impose
barriers to entry, particularly for small firms.85 These barriers protect
existing insurance providers from competition and deprive consumers of
lower cost products and more innovative products. In addition,
insurance companies will attempt to pass along to their business and
consumer clients the costs that they incur to comply with the existing
regulatory regime in the United States.86 Thus, consumers and the U.S.
economy as a whole pay a large price for the current state regulatory
structure for insurance.
4. The State System Contained Regulatory Gaps and Allowed
Regulatory Arbitrage
Functional regulation only works well when the definitions of
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 32, 36.
BAIR, supra note 24, at i–ii.
Id. at 51.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See STEVEN W. POTTIER, STATE REGULATION OF LIFE INSURERS: IMPLICATIONS FOR
ECONOMIC
EFFICIENCY
AND
FINANCIAL
STRENGTH
(2007),
available
at
http://www.aria.org/meetings/2007papers/IIB%20-%202%20-%20Pottier.pdf.
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banking, securities, and insurance are clear and allow firms and products
to be easily categorized. Unfortunately, the definitions for banking,
securities, and insurance do not provide hard and fast rules that enable
regulators to place firms or products easily in one category or another.
This situation is due in part to the fact that statutes and courts have
always struggled with how to define banking, securities, and insurance
products. It has been exacerbated by the fact that financial services
firms constantly create new hybrid financial products that fall within the
gaps between the definitions for banking, securities, and insurance
products allowing the hybrid products to avoid government regulations,
at least for awhile.
As noted in Part I(B)(1) above, there is no single, all-purpose
definition for insurance. The definitions that do exist grew out of the
institutional regulatory regime and tend to define insurance in relation to
the entity offering the product or service. For example, insurance
regulators tend to exclude self-insurance that arises when an individual
or an entity sets aside funds or other assets to cover any future losses or
damages, as beyond the scope of their regulatory powers. They do so on
the grounds that “insurance” is about risk sharing and self-insurance
does not involve risk sharing, but instead involves risk retention.87 On
the other hand, the law does not leave self-insurance completely
unregulated, but instead sometimes limits the ability of individuals or
entities to engage in self-insurance by mandating that everyone must
obtain certain types of insurance, such as automobile insurance.
To illustrate how the definitions of insurance led to regulatory gaps,
one need only look at why investment banks originally created certain
derivatives, like credit default swaps, and how they worked to keep
them unregulated.88 Bankers Trust and JP Morgan created the first
CDSs in the early 1990s.89 They wanted to create an instrument that
would help banks to protect themselves against the downside risk of

87. See generally APPLEMAN, supra note 49.
88. Outlining all of the different ways that derivatives are used as substitutes for insurance is
beyond the scope of this paper. For a fuller discussion of some of these instruments, see PETER
CARAYANNOPOULOS ET AL., INSURANCE SECURITIZATION: CATASTROPHIC EVENT EXPOSURE AND THE
ROLE OF INSURANCE LINKED SECURITIES IN ADDRESSING RISK (2003); J. David Cummins, CAT Bonds
and Other Risk-Linked Securities: State of the Market and Recent Developments (2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1057401; Tamar Frankel & Joseph W. LaPlume, Securitizing Insurance Risks,
19 Ann. REV. BANKING L. 203 (2000); Richard W. Gorvett, Insurance Securitization: The Development
of a New Asset Class (1999), available at http://www.casact.org/pubs/dpp/dpp99/99dpp133.pdf;
Changki Kim, Taehan Bae & Reginald J. Kulperger, Securitization of Motor Insurance Loss Rate Risks
(2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1134606.
89. Harry Wilson, A Short History of Credit Default Swaps, TELEGRAPH (Sept. 6, 2011, 7:44
PM), available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/8745511/A-shorthistory-of-credit-default-swaps.html.
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default on their loans to their large corporate clients.90
At the time, federal and state laws prohibited Bankers Trust, which
was an investment bank, from selling insurance products, such as
financial guarantee insurance. Financial guarantee insurance is “[a]n
insurance policy covering a lender from liability resulting from the
failure of a borrower to repay the loan.”91 In 1991, only state-licensed
insurance companies could sell insurance products and federal laws
prohibited large commercial and investment banks from being affiliated
with insurance companies.92
In order to sidestep the state insurance regulations, Bankers Trust and
JP Morgan needed to create a product that they could argue did not meet
the definition of “insurance.” They needed to do this even after
Congress enacted the CFMA because the CFMA did not exempt
derivatives from state insurance laws, but only from state gaming and
bucket shop laws.93
The banks attempted to avoid insurance regulations by making
payments under a CDS tied only to whether the relevant borrower
defaulted and not on whether the holder of the CDS actually suffered a
loss due to the default. Thus, they did not make it a requirement that
someone buying a CDS had to actually own the loan that was the subject
of the CDS.
Originally, however, the entities seeking the CDS protection usually
were the ones that had made the loan and would actually suffer a loss if
the borrower defaulted.94 Such CDSs would later be referred to as
“covered” CDSs.95 In addition, each CDS contract was relatively costly
to create because it had to be individually negotiated in a process that
could potentially take months.96 Eventually, ISDA would devise
standardized CDS contracts that allowed the transactions to be

90. See id.
91. Financial Guarantee Insurance, FARLEX FINANCIAL DICTIONARY (2011), available at
http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Financial+Guarantee+Insurance.
92. This prohibition on banks and insurance company affiliations was eroded over time and
eventually eliminated with the passage of the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act. See GLBA,12 U.S.C. §§ 78,
377 (2010).
93. See Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 2 (2000)) at 7
U.S.C. § 27f (2010). Gaming laws generally prohibit or severely limited gambling. Bucket shop laws
prohibit bets being made on changes in the prices of stocks or commodities, in which the parties never
intend to actually deliver the stocks or commodities involved.
94. The Role of Financial Derivatives in the Current Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the S.
Comm on Agric., Nutrition, and Forestry, 110th Cong. 2–3 (2008) (statement of Eric Dinallo,
Superintendent, New York State Insurance Department) [hereinafter Dinallo].
95. Id. at 3.
96. See Michael Pohly & James Vore, Insurers Eye Derivatives for Credit Risk, 106 Nat’l
Underwriter/Prop. Casualty Risk & Benefits Mgmt. 38 (2002); René M. Stulz, Credit Default Swaps and
the Credit Crisis, 24 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 73, 78 (2010).
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negotiated more quickly than the earlier, bespoke deals and brought
down the costs of creating a CDS.97 In addition, standardization allowed
CDSs to become easily traded. With the reduction in costs and the
increased ease of trade, speculators, who did not own the loans that, if
the borrowers defaulted, would require payments under the relevant
CDSs, increasingly dominated the CDS markets.98
Such CDS
transactions became known as “naked” CDSs.99
The existence of the naked CDSs enabled the banks to convince many
insurance regulators to view CDSs as something other than insurance
and thus, not subject to insurance laws and regulations. The states and
U.S. courts have developed several tests to determine when something is
insurance and when it is not. The one that is most relevant for how New
York’s insurance regulators viewed CDSs is the Substantial Control
Test.100
The Substantial Control Test grew out of Professor William R.
Vance’s description of an insurance contract in 1904.101 Under his
definition, an insurance contract was between the insurer and the insured
and required five elements:
(1) The insured must possess an interest, the insurable interest, in the
thing being insured and the value of that interest must be able to be
assessed;
(2) The insured must be subject to a risk of loss if the insured interest is
destroyed or damaged by the happening of certain specified fortuitous
events;
(3) The insurer assumes the risk of loss (also known as risk transference);
(4) The insurer assumes this risk of loss as part of a general plan to
distribute actual losses amongst a large group bearing similar risks; and
(5) The insured pays a fee to the insurer, which goes into a general
insurance fund, as consideration for the insurer’s promise to assume the
risk of loss.102

New York’s statutory definition for insurance seems to be based on
this test. New York defines an insurance contract as:
[A]ny agreement or other transaction whereby one party, the ‘insurer’ is
obligated to confer benefit of pecuniary value upon another party, the
‘insured’ or ‘beneficiary’ dependent upon the happening of a fortuitous

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Pohly & Vore, supra note 96.
See id.; Stulz, supra note 96.
See Pohly & Vore, supra note 96; Stulz, supra note 96, at 84–85.
APPLEMAN, supra note 49, § 1.4.
Id.
Id.
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event in which the insured or beneficiary has, or is expected to have at the
time of such happening, a material interest which will be adversely
affected by the happening of such event.103

The language requiring that the agreement compensate when an
insured’s interest is adversely affected tracks with Professor Vance’s
requirement that the insured suffer a “loss” if his insured interest is
destroyed or damaged.
In June of 2000, the New York State Department of Insurance
General Counsel was asked to opine on the following question: “Does a
credit default swap transaction, wherein the counterparty (‘seller’) will
make payment to the buyer upon the happening of a negative credit
event and such payment is not dependent upon the buyer having
suffered a loss, constitute a contract of insurance under the insurance
law?”104 The question was specifically phrased to highlight the lack of
any requirement that the CDS buyer had suffered a “loss” in order to
receive payment.105 It was designed to convince the New York State
Department of Insurance to opine that CDSs were not insurance and the
New York State Department of Insurance did just that. The question
was phrased only to deal with naked CDSs but both the industry and the
New York State Department of Insurance treated it as if the opinion
covered all CDS transactions.106 Some banks entered into covered
CDSs with the intent to protect against loan losses, and therefore
covered CDSs arguably should have fallen within the New York
statutory definition of insurance.107 In 2004, New York amended its
insurance laws to specifically exclude all CDSs from being classified as
insurance.108
The result in New York was not inevitable. New York could have
used other definitions for insurance that would have classified CDSs as
insurance. In fact, after GLBA and CFMA were enacted, NAIC
attempted to convince state regulators to include derivatives within their
regulatory definitions of insurance. NAIC was specifically concerned
about weather derivatives, but a definition of insurance broad enough to
encompass weather derivatives would have also classified other
derivatives, like CDSs, as insurance.
Weather derivatives are usually based on indexes that rely on the
103. N.Y. INSURANCE LAW § 1101 (McKinney 2011). New York defines a fortuitous event as
“any occurrence or failure to occur which is, or is assumed by the parties to be, to a substantial extent
beyond the control of either party.” Id.
104. N.Y. Dep’t of Ins., Op. Re: Credit Default Option Facility, 2000 NY Insurance GC Opinions
LEXIS 144 (2000).
105. Dinallo, supra note 94, at 5.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. N.Y. INSURANCE LAW § 6901(j–l) (McKinney 2011).
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average temperatures and precipitation.109
They are sometimes
structured as swaps or options.110 A weather option, for example,
requires the seller to pay the buyer an agreed upon amount at a set time
if certain weather conditions develop, such as when the temperature is
above normal by ten degrees during the summer.111 Weather derivatives
can be used to protect against crop damage due to drought, or property
damage due to a hurricane. From the buyer’s perspective, weather
derivatives may sometimes be better than more traditional insurance
policies because weather derivatives do not require the buyer to show
that he actually suffered harm before receiving payment. Weather
derivatives have become more popular in recent years, with over $121
billion worth of weather derivative contracts traded either over the
counter or on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange between 2004 and
2009.112
In 2003, NAIC released a Draft White Paper on whether weather
derivatives should fit within the definition of insurance.113 NAIC
focused on two factors that it felt should justify classifying weather
derivatives as insurance.114 First, weather derivatives involved the
transfer of risk for a fee and usually “businesses that are involved in
accepting risk transfers for a fee are known as insurers and the fee paid
by the entity seeking to transfer its risk is known as premium.”115
Essentially, NAIC was arguing for the same kind of substance over form
analysis that is used in tax to recharacterize transactions whose form is
designed to avoid the taxes that normally would be imposed based on
the actual substance of the deal.116 Second, allowing unregulated
speculation in weather derivatives would promote price manipulation
and, thus, create additional risks to the system rather than reducing
risks.117 Both of these arguments could also be applied to CDSs. In
fact, in the wake of the financial crisis, Eric Dinallo, then
Superintendent for the New York State Department of Insurance,
testified before Congress that naked CDSs had added risks to the
financial system by encouraging gambling rather than socially useful

109. INS. INFO. INST, THE FINANCIAL SERVICES FACT BOOK 2010 95 (2010).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 96.
113. National Ass’n of Ins. Comm’rs., Weather Financial Instruments (Temperature): Insurance
or Capital Markets Products? (NAIC Draft White Paper, Sept. 2, 2003) [hereinafter NAIC WHITE
PAPER].
114. Robert F. Schwartz, Risk Distribution in Capital Markets: Credit Default Swaps, Insurance
and a Theory of Demarcation, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 167, 184–86 (2007).
115. Id. at 184–85; NAIC WHITE PAPER, supra note 113, at 368.
116. Schwartz, supra note 114, at 184–85.
117. NAIC WHITE PAPER, supra note 113, at 368–69.
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risk mitigation.118
ISDA, the Bond Market Association, and many academics have
pushed back against attempts to classify CDSs as insurance. They have
argued that the definition of insurance should focus on the concepts of
“insurable interest” and “loss indemnification.”119
It is worth noting, however, that not all traditional insurance products
actually require the buyer to suffer a loss. Annuities are a traditional
insurance product that involve risk transference but do not indemnify the
purchaser for a loss. In fact, insurance companies market annuities as
investment vehicles. With an annuity, the buyer pays for the right to
receive a stream of payments in the future until the death of the
annuitant. The terms for annuities can vary based on the nature of the
underlying investment, the primary purpose of the annuity, the type of
pay-out commitment, and the tax status of the annuity. The annuity can
guarantee a fixed rate of return on the underlying investment or a
variable rate of return. Annuities with fixed rates of return are called
fixed annuities and those with variable rates of return are called variable
annuities. In order to achieve the variable rates of return, variable
annuities invest in stocks, bonds, and other investments. The primary
purpose of the annuity can be to accumulate wealth or to provide a
guaranteed pay-out for a certain period of time.
Annuities can serve as a tax deferral vehicle, similar to a 401(k) plan
or an individual retirement account (IRA), but without the limits on
contributions that those investment vehicles entail. Annuities are
marketed as investment vehicles, particularly for those concerned about
retirement. Annuities are pushed by the insurance industry as an
alternative to or a supplement to more traditional investment vehicles,
such as mutual funds, IRAs, and 401(k) plans.
Retirees sometimes find annuities’ guaranteed payments until the end
of their lives preferable to trying to managing their funds in a 401(k) or
IRA plan because the guaranteed payments allows them to shift their
longevity risk onto the insurance companies providing the annuities.
Longevity risk is the risk that a person will live longer than predicted. It
118. See Dinallo, supra note 94, at 3.
119. See, e.g., Thomas Lee Hazen, Disparate Regulatory Schemes for Parallel Activities:
Securities Regulation, Derivatives Regulation, Gambling, and Insurance, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING &
FIN. L. 375, 401–12, 416–18 (2005) (noting that derivatives often fail to meet insurable interest
requirements needed to be classified as insurance); M. Todd Henderson, Credit Derivatives are not
“Insurance”, 16 CONN. INS. L. J. 1 (2009); Kimball-Stanley, supra note 10, at 246–47 (discussing the
Robin Potts, QC, opinion relied upon by ISDA and the Bond Market Association on why CDSs are not
insurance); Schwartz, supra note 114, at 174 (“The aim of this article is to develop an explanatory
theory of why CDS are not insurance.”); Jeffrey Thomas, Insurance Perspectives on Federal Financial
Regulatory Reform: Addressing Misunderstandings and Providing a View from a Different Paradigm,
55 VILLANOVA L. R. 773, 776–78 (2010), available at http://www.law.villanova.edu/lawreview/wpcontent/uploads/2011/12/VLR308.pdf (CDSs are not insurance because they do not involve pooling).
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is problematic for people relying on savings or securities to fund their
retirement because they may outlive their assets and end up having to
rely solely on government programs, like Social Security and Medicare,
to cover their living expenses. In these cases, the retirees have not
suffered a loss in the sense of being deprived of something of value that
they actually possessed because 401(k) and IRA plans provide no
guarantees that their funds will be able to provide a fixed level of funds
to cover a retiree’s living expenses for any period of time.
Thus, when a retiree decides to shift his longevity risk to an insurance
company by buying an annuity, the insurance product, the annuity, is
qualitatively different from traditional life insurance or
property/casualty insurance.
In the case of life insurance or
property/casualty insurance, the policy indemnifies the insured for being
deprived of something that they did actually possess at one time.
In the case of annuities, the insurance company finds longevity risk
problematic if it must pay out more than it originally estimated because
the annuitant has lived longer than the insurance company’s actuaries
predicted. While the insurance company may suffer a loss in the form
of lower profits because of these larger pay-outs, such losses are little
different than the losses suffered by the firm issuing a CDS who
misjudges the likelihood that the company issuing the bonds, on which
the CDS was written, will default. Definitions of “insurance”, like the
Substantial Control Test, however, are not concerned with the losses
suffered by the insurer, but only with the losses suffered by the insured.
Following the financial crisis, New York and several other states
changed their minds regarding whether CDSs should be regulated as
insurance.
On September 22, 2008, the New York Insurance
Department decided that beginning in January 2009, the credit default
swaps, in which the buyer of the swap owns the underlying bond that it
meant to back, would be classified as insurance in New York.120 It
ultimately decided to put these new regulations on hold until it could
assess what reforms the federal government would enact and whether
those reforms would go far enough to correct the problem.121
5. The State System Hindered the Establishment of International
Standards
The development of international norms and standards for many types
120. Danny Hakim, New York to Regulate Credit Default Swaps, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 23, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/23/business/23swap.html.
121. Leah Campbell & Robin Choi, State Initiatives to Regulate Credit Default Swaps Deferred
Pending Federal Action, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNSEL (Sept. 2009), at 20, available at
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2009/September/20.pdf.
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of insurance is a relatively new phenomenon when compared with the
development of international norms and standards for other commercial
activities, such as trade in goods or banking. This is perhaps because
many types of insurance were considered to be governed primarily by
local, rather than international conditions. Life insurance, property and
casualty insurance, and health insurance comprise the largest sectors
within insurance based on premiums. In each case, local laws and local
conditions have a significant impact on shaping the risks being insured
against by insurance firms. State insurance commissioners have relied
upon the local character of insurance markets as a major justification for
why they should regulate insurance rather than the federal government.
Nevertheless, a number of factors are putting increasing pressure on
governments and market participants to develop international norms and
standards for insurance. Financial services markets are increasingly
interconnected, which means that the risks posed by one region or sector
can more easily spill out and affect other regions and sectors. This
interconnectedness is due in part to the increasing number of financial
products and services that are fungible with one another. Hybrid
products that contain elements of traditional banking, securities or
insurance products are being created more frequently now than ever
before. These products are breaking down the distinctions between the
banking, securities, and insurance sectors. The result is that financial
services now form a continuum between products that are predominately
characterized by their risk transference attributes and products that are
predominately characterized by their investment attributes rather than
distinct silos for banking, insurance, and securities.
Financial products also are linking previously separate sectors as
products from one sector are repackaged to spread and diversify the
risks. The financial crisis has highlighted this fact as banks sold
mortgages, a traditional banking product, to special purpose vehicles
(SPVs) that bundled them together and issued securities that would pay
based on the income stream generated by the payments on the
mortgages. The risk that those securities would default was insured
against either by the SPVs taking out bond insurance on the securities or
by the purchasers entering into credit default swaps.
Technology also is making it easier to purchase products and services
from distant suppliers. The Internet allows individual consumers to
compare the prices and products of insurance companies from around
the world. These opportunities occur less frequently for insurance
products than for other financial products because state laws frequently
require that insurers are licensed by the relevant state before they can
market and sell their products to the residents of that state. All of these
developments are weakening the ties that traditionally made insurance a

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss2/6

24

Brown: Will the Federal Insurance Office Improve Insurance Regulation?

2012]

INSURAN
NCE REGULAT
TION

575

financiaal product do
ominated by local
l
or regioonal concerns.
In ad
ddition, as th
he markets in the Uniteed States andd the Europpean
Union mature,
m
the multinationa
m
al insurance aand financiall conglomeraates
are exp
panding theirr operations in emergingg markets annd ratchetingg up
the glo
obal compettition for market
m
sharess in insurannce.122 Eurrope
comprissed 35.4 perrcent of the worldwide
w
innsurance preemiums in 20010
while th
he United Sttates comprissed 28.6 perrcent.123 Thee areas show
wing
the larg
gest potentiall for growth in
i the near fu
future are thee nations in A
Asia
other th
han Japan and
d Latin Amerrica.124
Fig. 1: Marrket Shares of World In
nsurance Maarket125

Thesse factors have led to calls for the ddevelopment of internatioonal
standards for insu
urance regulation.
Intternational norms can be
develop
ped in one of
o three way
ys: (1) de juure standardd-setting cann be
develop
ped through treaties
t
or otther binding internationall agreements, 126
(2) de facto stand
dard-setting can arise bby individuaal governmeents
adoptin
ng similar laws
l
withou
ut engagingg in any ccoordination or
cooperaative activitiees with one another,127 aand (3) grouup or committee
122. See John A. Cook
ke & Harold D. Sk
kipper, An Evalua tion of the US Insuurance Regulationn in a
Competitivve World Insurancce Market 3 (Amerrican Ins. Ass’n, Juune 27, 2008).
123. DATAMONITOR, INDUSTRY PROFFILE: INSURANCEE IN THE UNITED
D STATES 12 (2
2011)
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]
124. Cooke & Skipperr, supra note 122, at 3.
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standard-setting can result in soft law such as non-binding principles or
guidelines developed by intergovernmental forums.128 Few treaties or
other binding international agreements exist in the area of insurance.
The General Agreement on Trade in Services129 (GATS), the North
American Free Trade Agreement130 (NAFTA), and the European
Union’s Solvency II Directive131 (Solvency II) are the most important
international agreements dealing with insurance.132 De facto standardsetting is more common as national insurance regulations generally
incorporate regulations that address both prudential and market conduct
risks and, thus, usually contain similar features.133 Group or committee
standard-setting that produces soft law has only developed within the
past twenty years with the creation of forums like the International
Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) and the Financial Stability
Board (FSB).134
The fragmentary nature of the American state-based system of
insurance regulation, and the fact that the states within the United States
have had difficulty adopting uniform standards, have made it difficult
for the United States to negotiate international standards either in the
form of soft law standards or principles or in the form of hard law found
in treaties and other binding international agreements. David Snyder,
Assistant General Counsel of the American Insurance Association,
noted, “[d]espite the strong efforts of some regulators, the state
regulatory system is structurally incapable of representing U.S. interests
effectively, because it must defend the inefficient U.S. regulatory system
and its lacks the legal authority to bind the United States.”135 The state
insurance commissions lack the authority under the U.S. Constitution to
negotiate binding international agreements on insurance.136 The federal
128. Id. at 26–27.
129. General Agreement on Trade in Services, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/English/docs_e/legal_e/legal_e.htm#services (follow link under the Uruguay Round
Agreements, Annex 1, Annex 1B General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) (last visited May 17,
2013).
130. See North American Free Trade Agreement, NAFTA SECRETARIAT, http://www.nafta-secalena.org/en/view.aspx?x=343 (last visited May 17, 2013).
131. Directive 2009/138/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 Nov. 2009 on
the taking-up and pursuit of the business of Insurance and Reinsurance (Solvency II), available at
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:335:0001:0155:EN:PDF
[hereinafter SOLVENCY II].
132. See Ahdieh, supra note 126, at 26–27.
133. Cooke & Skipper, supra note 122, at 1.
134. Ahdieh, supra note 126, at 21–27.
135. Meg Fletcher, U.S. Regulators Seek to Increase Visibility, INSURANCE NEWS NET (Jan. 5,
2009), http://insurancenewsnet.com/print.aspx?id=102303&type=annuity.
136. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 8–9 (giving to Congress the power to regulate commerce with
foreign powers and prohibiting the states from negotiating international agreements with foreign powers
without the consent of Congress).
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government, which has the authority under the U.S. Constitution to
negotiate such agreements, had no agency prior to the enactment of the
Dodd–Frank Act that was tasked with monitoring the insurance industry
and that could provide useful advice during such negotiations.137 The
U.S. Trade Representative’s Office, which negotiated the GATS,
generally lacked the authority to bind the states and to ensure that they
would enact the necessary domestic laws to codify any concession that it
might make.138 As a result, the international agreements on insurance
negotiated to date contain substantial exemptions for state insurance
laws.139 The breadth of these exemptions means that the principles
embodied in the GATS and other trade agreements are not binding, in
many cases, on the states within the United States and the extent to
which the states meet those principles is more a function of soft law
rather than hard law.
Several international forums seek to promote the development of soft
law international norms in the area of insurance. The primary forum is
IAIS, which has over 190 members (including the insurance
commissions from all fifty states within the United States) from about
140 countries.140 Compared to the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (Basel Committee) and International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO), IAIS is a relatively new organization.
It was founded in 1994, while the Basel Committee and IOSCO were
formed in 1974.
IAIS has issued principles, standards, and guidance papers on a range
of insurance regulatory issues such as capital adequacy, licensing, and
financial conglomerates.141 The principles and standards promulgated
by IAIS have to be approved by two-thirds of its members at a general
meeting.142 Because of the large number of its members and its
consensus style of approval for principles and standards, the IAIS
principles and standards represent a floor when it comes to insurance
regulation.
IAIS envisions risk management as primarily the responsibility of the
137. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8.
138. See Cooke & Skipper, supra note 122, at 18.
139. Id. at 18–19.
140. INT. ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS, ANNUAL REP. 2006–07, at iv. (2007). Each of the fifty
states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. territories is a member of IAIS. See Membership List,
NAT. ASS’N OF INS. COMMISSIONERS (2012), http://www.naic.org/documents/members_membershipli
st.pdf.
141. See, e.g., INT. ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS, SUPERVISOR STANDARD OF LICENSING (2008);
INT. ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS, PRINCIPLES OF CAPITAL ADEQUACY AND SOLVENCY (2002); INT.
ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS, SUPERVISORY STANDARD ON GROUP COORDINATION (2000), available at
http://www.iaisweb.org/About-the-IAIS-28.
142. See INT. ASS’N OF INS. SUPERVISORS BY-LAWS, art. 12(1) (2005), available at
http://www.iaisweb.org/__temp/By-laws_2005_edition.pdf.
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insurer and that the role of the insurance regulator is to guarantee that
the insurer meets this obligation.143 IAIS standards would allow
supervisors to give individual insurers a great deal of flexibility in terms
of assessing and reserving for the risks that they face. IAIS believes that
risk sensitive regulatory requirements, which take into account both
quantitative and qualitative factors, are preferable to fixed ratios or
limits because they provide insurers with better incentives for managing
risk, discourage regulatory arbitrage, and enable the better use of
resources.144
Most nations around the world do not yet regulate insurance company
solvency using the risk-based approach advocated by the IAIS. The
European Union has adopted a regulatory regime called Solvency II that
is very similar to the standards espoused by the IAIS.145 The states
within the United States, however, use a combination of formula-based
minimum reserves and factor-based minimum capital requirements that
have been adjusted in recent years to include some risk-based modeling
approaches.146 NAIC adopted a Solvency Modernization Initiative
Work Plan to examine to what extent U.S. insurance regulations will
need to change in response to IAIS principles or other developments
around the world, such as the EU Solvency II.147
The failure of AIG and the U.S. investment banks to predict
accurately the risks to which they were exposed based on their internal
models has raised doubts about the effectiveness of current risk
management models and the use of mark-to-market accounting
practices.148 These concerns may lead to a reevaluation of whether
143. The IAIS Common Structure for the Assessment of Insurer Solvency, INTERNATIONAL
ASSOCIATION
OF
INSURANCE
SUPERVISORS
14
(February
2007),
http://www.iaisweb.org/view/element_href.cfm?src=1/85.pdf.
144. Id. at 15–17.
145. See SOLVENCY II, supra note 131, at Art. 218–46.
146. Andrew F. Giffin & Mike Lombardi, Financial Services: Towards a Global Solvency
Standard, 2 Emphasis 18, 20 (2006), available at http://www.towersperrin.com/tp/getwebcachedoc?we
bc=TILL/USA/2006/200605/SolvenyQ2523.pdf.
147. Richard Crump, Solvency II: Setting a Global Standard, REACTIONS (Aug. 1, 2008),
available at http://www.reactionsnet.com/Article/2148178/Solvency-II-Setting-a-global-standard.html.
148. Pursuant to the Congressional requirement in the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of
2008, the SEC issued a report in December on impact of mark-to-market accounting in the current
financial crisis. SEC, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 133 OF THE
EMERGENCY ECONOMIC STABILIZATION ACT OF 2008: MARK-TO-MARKET ACCOUNTING (2008),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/marktomarket123008.pdf. This report concluded
that mark-to-market accounting had not played a significant role in the current crisis and that the
benefits to investors from the transparency provided by mark-to-market accounting outweighed any
costs associated with the practice. Id. at 7–8. The report did make some recommendations about how
fair value and mark-to-market accounting could be improved. Id. at 7–10. This report, however, has not
halted the ongoing debate about whether mark-to-market accounting contributed to the current financial
crisis. Even before the current financial began, some academics raised the possibility that mark-tomarket accounting might cause a financial crisis when one would not have occurred using traditional
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allowing risk-based regulation using company generated models, as
IAIS has proposed, is prudent.
Finally, it is important to note that the Financial Stability Board has a
growing role in the development of international norms for financial
supervision and regulation, including in the area of insurance. The FSB
is the international body tasked with coordinating the work of national
regulators and international standard setting bodies for financial
services.149 To promote financial stability, the FSB is attempting to
identify systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs), which
would include global or highly interconnected insurers or insurance
groups, like AIG. The FSB’s work influences and is influenced by the
work of national bodies tasked with promoting financial stability, like
the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) in the United States.
The FSB’s effort to identify SIFIs has spurred IAIS to undertake its own
determination of which insurers or insurance groups are systemically
important.
III. THE DODD–FRANK ACT AND INSURANCE
The Dodd–Frank Act contains several provisions that affect insurance
regulation. In addition to the creation of FIO, the Dodd–Frank Act sets
forth new rules for non-admitted insurers and reinsurance that preempt
parts of the existing state rules, allows the FSOC to designated certain
insurance companies as systemically important and subject to regulation
by the Federal Reserve, establishes new rules for swaps that insurers and
other financial firms use, and puts limits on proprietary trading by
financial firms under certain conditions under a rule commonly referred
to as the Volcker Rule.150 Congress, however, intended the Federal
Insurance Office to be the main federal entity dealing with insurance
issues.
A. Origins of the FIO
The Dodd–Frank Act was not the first governmental proposal to
create a federal office of insurance. Since GLBA was enacted, some
accounting. See, e.g., Franklin Allen & Elena Carletti, Mark-to-Market Accounting and Liquidity
Pricing (Financial Institutions Center, Wharton School of Business, University of Pennsylvania, No. 0615 2006), available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/06/0615.pdf.
149. Overview, FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/about/overv
iew.htm (last visited May 17, 2013).
150. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volker originally proposed this rule in 2009 and, as
a result, the rule now bears his name. James B. Stewart, Volcker Rule, Once Simple, Now Boggles, NY
TIMES (Oct. 21, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/22/business/volcker-rule-grows-from-simpleto-complex.html?pagewanted=all.
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members of the insurance industry have supported creating an optional
federal charter for insurance similar to the dual charter structure in
banking, which allowed the institutions being regulated to choose
whether they would be licensed to operate by a particular state or by the
federal government. All of the optional federal charter bills included
some form of federal insurance office, usually modeled after the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency, to handle federal regulation of
insurance.151
In March 2008, the U.S. Department of the Treasury under then
Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson published its ideas for improving the
U.S. financial regulatory structure called the Blueprint for a Modernized
Financial Regulatory Structure.152 The U.S. Treasury Blueprint called
for the creation of an Office of Insurance Oversight to deal with
international insurance regulatory issues and to advise the Secretary of
the Treasury on major domestic and international insurance policy
issues.153 The Treasury considered these aspects of insurance regulation
ones, on which immediate attention was needed.154
Representative Paul Kanjorski introduced the Insurance Information
Act of 2008155 as one way to implement the U.S. Treasury Blueprint’s
call for a federal office to monitor insurance. In the Insurance
Information Act, the office was to be called the Office of Insurance
Information (OII). In other respects, it had the same features as FIO.
OII would provide information on insurance issues to Congress and to
Executive Branch agencies and would have the power along with the
U.S. Trade Representative’s Office to negotiate treaties and international
agreements setting insurance regulatory standards and practices that
would preempt state insurance laws.156 Ultimately, this idea for an
office of insurance information at the federal level was incorporated into
the Dodd–Frank Act as the Federal Insurance Office.
B. Functions of the FIO
The Dodd–Frank Act stipulates that FIO is responsible for all

151. See, e.g., Insurance Consumer Protection Act of 2003, supra note 3, §§ 101–10 (would have
created an insurance regulatory commission); National Insurance Act of 2006, supra note 3, §§ 1101–05
(would have created an office of national insurance); National Insurance Act of 2007, supra note 3,
§§ 1101–05 (would have created an office of national insurance); National Insurance Act of 2007, supra
note 3, §§ 1101–05 (would have created an office of national insurance).
152. PAULSON TREASURY BLUEPRINT, supra note 4.
153. Id. at 132–33.
154. Id.
155. Insurance Information Act of 2008, H.R. 5840, 110th Cong. (2008). This act was introduced
by Rep. Paul Kanjorski (D-PA).
156. Id. § 313(e).
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insurance lines, except those for healthcare, long-term care, and crop
insurance.157 It has seven functions.158 Its first function is to monitor
the insurance industry to determine if any regulatory gaps could pose
systemic risks.159 In order to accomplish this function, FIO was given
the power to collect information, including the power to compel insurers
to provide the information that it deems necessary to achieve its
functions.160 However, before FIO can make any information requests,
it must first check with the other relevant federal and state agencies and
with publicly available sources to determine if it can obtain the needed
data from them.161 If it can, then FIO cannot compel any insurer to
provide it with the data.162
FIO’s second function is to monitor whether low to moderate income
persons and other underserved communities have access to insurance at
affordable rates.163 Essentially, this provision is an attempt to recreate
the federal protections currently provided for these groups by
commercial banking in the area of insurance. Unlike the federal
banking regulators, however, FIO does not have the regulatory authority
to take action against insurers who refuse to provide insurance to these
groups at affordable rates. FIO is required to share any information that
it obtains with the relevant state regulators.164 It would have to rely on
the state regulators to take the appropriate actions to correct any
problems that it finds.
FIO’s third function is to make recommendations to the FSOC
regarding which insurers pose systemic risks and should be classified as
systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) to be supervised by
the Federal Reserve.165 It has a non-voting seat on FSOC.166 It holds
157. DODD–FRANK ACT, supra note 12; 31 U.S.C. § 313 (2010).
158. Id.
159. Id. § 313(c)(1)(A).
160. Id. § 313(e).
161. Id. § 313(e)(4).
162. Id.
163. Id. § 313(c)(1)(B).
164. Id. § 313(e)(4).
165. Id. § 313(c)(1)(C). The Dodd–Frank Act does not use the term “systemically important
financial institutions”, or “SIFIs”, but its language embodies the same concept and as a result, the term
is widely used as short-hand for the actual language in the Dodd–Frank Act. See, e.g., Systemically
Important Financial Institutions and the Dodd–Frank Act: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Fin.
Inst. and Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs, 112th Cong. 1 (2012) (statement of Michael
S. Gibson, Director, Div. of Banking Supervision and Reg., Bd. of Gov. of the Fed. Res. System). The
international Financial Stability Board defines a “systemically important financial institution” as one
“whose distress or disorderly failure, because of their size, complexity and systemic interconnectedness,
would cause significant disruption to the wider financial system and economic activity.” FIN.
STABILITY BD., POLICY MEASURES TO ADDRESS SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
(Nov. 4, 2011), http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_111104bb.pdf. FSOC can classify
a non-bank financial company as subject to supervision by the Federal Reserve if the “material financial
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the same non-voting status on FSOC as the state insurance regulator
picked by the state insurance commissioners.167 The only member of
FSOC in the area of insurance that does have a vote is a person with
insurance expertise appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate.168 As a non-voting member, FIO is entitled to
attend all FSOC meetings, unless the other members deem it necessary
to “safeguard and promote the free exchange of confidential supervisory
information.”169
Given FIO’s limited powers on the FSOC, it is not surprising that it is
difficult to determine what influence it has wielded since joining FSOC.
For example, on April 5, 2013, the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System issued the final rule for the definition of a significant
nonbank financial company, which FSOC would use to determine
whether an insurance company or group poses a possible threat to the
financial stability of the United States and should be regulated by the
Federal Reserve.170 While this rule clearly contains provisions to take
into account certain unique features of the insurance industry, it is hard
to tell how much a role FIO played in tailoring these provisions as
opposed to the influence of the independent insurance representative on
FSOC, the state insurance commissioners’ representative on FSOC,
NAIC, or the insurance industry.
FIO’s last four functions all involve some aspect of international
relations. It must assist the U.S. Treasury Department in administering
the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, which the U.S. government enacted
in the wake of the 9/11 attacks because the private markets were
unwilling or unable to provide coverage for terrorist acts.171 FIO is
responsible for coordinating federal participation in negotiating
international insurance standards on prudential issues.172 It also must
distress at the U.S. nonbank financial company, or the nature, scope, size, scale, concentration,
interconnectedness, or mix of the activities of the U.S. nonbank financial company, could pose a threat
to the financial stability of the United States.” DODD–FRANK ACT, supra note 12; 12 U.S.C.
§ 5323(a)(1).
166. DODD–FRANK ACT, supra note 12; 12 U.S.C. § 5321(b)(2).
167. Id. The NAIC appointed John M. Huff as the current state insurance commissioner on the
FSOC. About the Director, MISSOURI DEPT. OF INS., FIN. INST., & PROF. REGISTRATION,
http://difp.mo.gov/director.php (last visited May 17, 2013).
168. Id. § 5321(b)(1). Currently, S. Roy Woodall, Jr. holds the position of the independent
insurance expert on FSOC. Financial Stability Oversight Council, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/about/council/Pages/roy_woodall.aspx (last visited May 17,
2013).
169. Id. § 5321(b)(3).
170. Definitions of “Predominantly Engaged In Financial Activities” and “Significant” Nonbank
Financial Company and Bank Holding Company, 78 Fed. Reg. 20,756 (Apr. 5, 2013) (to be codified at
12 C.F.R. pt. 242), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2013-04-05/pdf/2013-07688.pdf.
171. DODD–FRANK ACT, supra note 12; 31 U.S.C. § 313(c)(1)(D).
172. Id. § 313(c)(1)(E).
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consult with the states regarding both national and international
insurance issues.173 FIO is limited to advising on international
prudential standards and not market conduct standards. The state
insurance commissions continue to be the only entities with the power to
regulate and negotiate on standards for consumer protections and other
aspects of how the markets should operate.174
While FIO is to coordinate federal efforts to obtain international
insurance prudential standards, it does not have the power to negotiate
such agreements. Only the Treasury Secretary and the U.S. Trade
Representative (USTR) have the power to negotiate binding agreements
on such standards.175 FIO’s final international function is to determine
when the standards within an international agreement negotiated by the
Treasury Secretary and USTR will conflict with and preempt the
standards established by one or more of the state insurance commissions
within the United States.176
The Dodd–Frank Act, through the channel of international
agreements, has opened up the way for uniform standards to be imposed
upon the states. Congress had considered imposing such standards
through the State Modernization and Regulatory Transparency Act
(SMART Act).177 Former Representative Michael Oxley (R-OH) and
former Representative Richard Baker (R-LA) conceived of the SMART
Act as a means of getting the states to overcome the lack of uniform
regulations and the high costs of the state regulation of insurance.178
Representative Oxley tried to model the SMART Act after those
provisions in the GLBA that threatened to create a federal regulator
within a fixed timeframe if the states failed to enact certain types of laws
and regulations.179 Those provisions in GLBA spurred the states to
enter into reciprocity agreements that reduced the number of state
licensing applications that insurers had to file.
The SMART Act, if it had been enacted, would have required the
states to adopt the NAIC model laws regarding market conduct within
three years or have those model acts become law at the end of the three
year period automatically and preempt any contradictory laws.180 It also
would have required states to adopt the NAIC model laws governing
licensing of insurers, producers, and reinsurers within two to three years
173. Id. § 313(c)(1)(G).
174. See id. § 313(k).
175. Id. § 314.
176. Id. § 313(c)(1)(C)–(D).
177. SMART ACT, supra note 3.
178. Press Release, House Committee on Fin. Services, Oxley Outlines Road Map to State-Based
Insurance Regulatory Reform (Mar. 15, 2004).
179. Id.
180. SMART ACT, supra note 3, § 204.
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or have their laws be preempted and the NAIC laws put in their place at
the end of the specified timeframe.181 In addition, the SMART Act
would have required the states to end their regulation of rates after two
years.182 The SMART Act was never even introduced into Congress as
a bill because of questions raised about its constitutionality.183
The Dodd–Frank Act, however, does not suffer from these
constitutional issues due to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Missouri v.
Holland.184 In that case, the Supreme Court held that Congress could
impose national norms on the states through its treaty power.
While the federal government is not actively seeking to use its treaty
powers to impose prudential standards on the states at this time, FIO is
engaged in several international initiatives to clarify prudential
supervisory standards for insurance companies and insurance groups.
For example, in an attempt to help convince the EU that the U.S.
regulatory system provides “equivalent” protections to those provided
by Solvency II, FIO has created the US–EU Insurance Dialogue among
the European Commission (EC), the European Insurance and
Occupational Pensions Authority (EIOPA), the UK FSA, and the state
regulators to evaluate the European and U.S. systems of regulating
insurance along seven factors: (1) “group supervision”, (2) “capital and
use of internal models”, (3) “reinsurance”, (4) “professional secrecy or
confidentiality”, (5) “financial reporting”, (6) “supervisory peer
reviews”, and (7) “independent audits, actuarial reports and on-site
regulatory examinations.”185 If the U.S. regulators are unable to
convince the EU that the U.S. system is equivalent, then U.S. insurers
operating in the EU will have to undergo additional supervisory reviews
or standards imposed by the European insurance regulators.186
In addition, FIO is participating in the development of IAIS’s
Common Framework (ComFrame) for the supervision of global
systemically important insurers (G-SIIs).187 ComFrame seeks to
promote convergence among the different supervisory approaches
181. Id. §§ 301, 403, 900.
182. Id. at Title XVI.
183. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has stated that Congress could not compel the states to
enact or enforce a federal regulatory program and Congress imposing what insurance laws the states
must enforce would potentially violate this holding. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188
(1992).
184. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
185. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, Testimony of Federal Insurance Office (FIO)
Director Michael McRaith Before the House Financial Services Subcommittee on Insurance, Housing
and Community Opportunity on U.S. Insurance Sector: International Competitiveness and Jobs (May
17, 2012), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1585.aspx
[hereinafter McRaith Testimony 2012].
186. See SOLVENCY II, supra note 131, at Art. 172, 227.
187. Id.
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currently employed towards a global standard. ComFrame is not
intended to be an enforceable international agreement or treaty but
would only provide a soft law standard for supervising G-SIIs. In order
to become the law in the United States, the individual states would have
to enact statutes to bring their insurance laws into conformity with the
ComFrame standards. As a result, FIO’s main role is to work with the
NAIC and the state regulators to develop a coordinated U.S. policy for
the standards to be adopted by ComFrame.
Coordinating U.S. policy towards ComFrame will not be easy. In a
letter dated March 26, 2013, Representative Randy Neugebauer (RTexas) voiced the concerns of many state insurance commissioners and
industry officials that the current direction of ComFrame will harm the
competitiveness of U.S. insurers and impose unnecessary costs on
consumers if it is implemented in the United States.188 If the IAIS
cannot arrive at a consensus regarding which insurers are G-SIIs
because of U.S. concerns, then the bank-centric Financial Stability
Board would probably make the decision.189 The next draft of
ComFrame is due to be completed by September 2013.190
While FIO’s powers are limited, the provisions within the Dodd–
Frank Act do go a long way to address the problems that the state
insurance regulatory structure has created for achieving international
insurance norms. The real test will be whether the federal authorities
are willing to agree to international standards in the face of opposition
from some portion of the states within the United States.
C. Systemic Risk
The Dodd–Frank Act dealt with insurance issues in several places
besides its creation of FIO, although FIO has a role to play in assisting
other agencies in addressing these concerns. The most obvious instance
of this is the relationship between FSOC and FIO to address systemic
risk concerns raised by insurance companies.
The act gave FSOC the power to manage systemic risks, including
those posed by non-bank financial institutions such as insurance
companies. If non-bank financial institutions are deemed to pose
significant systemic risks, then a vote by two-thirds of the members of

188. Elizabeth Festa with Dave Postal, Neugebauer to FIO: I’m Concerned About IAIS Proposals,
LIFEHEALTHPRO (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2013/03/26/neugebauer-to-fio-imconcerned-about-iais-proposal.
189. Elizabeth D. Festa, IAIS Shows its Hand on FSB, Extends ComFrame Debate,
LIFEHEALTHPRO (Apr. 6, 2013), http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2013/04/06/iais-shows-its-hand-on-fsbextends-comframe-debate (citing comments from Yoshi Kawai, Secretary General of the IAIS).
190. Id.
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FSOC can subject those institutions to supervision by the Federal
Reserve.191 Under the Dodd–Frank Act, the Federal Reserve already
regulates any insurance conglomerate that is classified as either a
financial holding company, a bank holding company, or a thrift holding
company, such as AIG. Such firms, however, can escape the Federal
Reserve’s supervision if they sell off all of their banking or thrift
affiliates, if they did not receive financial assistance under the Troubled
Asset Relief Program (TARP), and if they are not classified as SIFIs by
FSOC.192 MetLife did just this by selling off its bank subsidiaries and
obtaining the approval from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve to deregister as a
bank holding company.193 In seeking deregistration, MetLife was aided
by the fact that it did not receive any TARP funds. Thus, assuming that
FSOC does not designate it as a SIFI, MetLife would no longer be
supervised by the Federal Reserve.194 AIG cannot escape Federal
Reserve supervision because it received TARP funds.
Many insurance conglomerates would prefer to escape the regulatory
reach of the Federal Reserve because they believe it to be more stringent
than the functional banking, securities, and insurance regulators. For
example, when MetLife failed the Federal Reserve’s stress tests in
March 2012, it claimed that the tests were too strict for a conglomerate
that was primarily an insurance provider and that it would have passed if
insurance capital adequacy standards had been applied, instead of
banking capital adequacy standards.195
Insurance firms and state regulators have repeatedly expressed
concerns over the years that if insurance regulation is moved to the
federal level that it will be distorted by the “bank-centric” federal
system. They have argued that insurance and banking are significantly
different from each other and that regulations designed for banks do not
work well for insurance companies, which have “different business
models, risk profiles, and capital needs than banks.”196
191. DODD–FRANK ACT, supra note 12; 12 U.S.C. § 5323.
192. Id. §§ 5323, 5327(a).
193. Press Release: MetLife, MetLife Sheds Bank Holding Company Status with Approvals from
the
Federal
Reserve
and
FDIC,
METLIFE
(Feb.
14,
2013),
http://investor.metlife.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=121171&p=irol-newsArticle&id=1785289.
194. Although FSOC has not yet named MetLife as a SIFI, MetLife’s chief executive office
attempted to deter them from doing so when he testified before the House Financial Services Committee
in early Mar. 2013. Danielle Douglas, MetLife CEO Makes Case Against Being Deemed ‘Systemically
Important’,
WASH. POST
(Mar.
7,
2013),
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-0307/business/37516979_1_financial-firms-tougher-oversight-kandarian.
195. Andrew Frye & Charles Mead, MetLife Leads Insurers Lower After Failed Fed Test,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-03-14/metlifeleads-life-insurers-lower-as-firm-fails-fed-capital-test.
196. Nat’l Assoc. Ins. Com. & Ctr. For Ins. Policy and Research, Government Relations Issues
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At least in terms of its membership, FSOC is bank-centric. Six of the
fifteen members are responsible for regulating some aspect of
depository institutions, which include banks, thrifts, and credit unions,
and five of them are voting members.197 Only three out of the fifteen
members of FSOC represent the insurance sector and only one of them
is a voting member.198 Only two out of the fifteen members regulate the
securities sector and only one of them is a voting member.199 By
themselves, the five voting members from banking regulators, if they
voted as a bloc, are only two votes short of the number of votes needed
to designate a non-bank financial institution as a SIFI and subject to
supervision by the Federal Reserve. The banking regulators do not
always agree with one another and as a result, it might not be so easy to
get the votes needed to classify insurance companies as SIFIs.
As noted above, the FSB will influence FSOC’s decisions regarding
which firms to classify as SIFIs and the prudential standards that will be
imposed on any entities designated as SIFIs. The FSB, like FSOC,
tends to be dominated by banking supervisors.200 As a result, state
insurance commissioners and U.S. insurance industry officials are
concerned that the FSB’s influence will cause the FSOC to use
inappropriate banking standards for determining which insurance firms
to classify as SIFIs and apply capital adequacy standards based on the
Basel III rules created for banking conglomerates rather than standards
that better take into account the unique business features of insurance.201
The U.S. representatives on the FSB are the Federal Reserve, the
Treasury Department, and the Securities and Exchange Commission.202
FIO’s input on the FSB’s SIFIs deliberations would be through the
Brief,
Federal
Reserve
Supervision
and
Basel
III:
Insurer
Impact,
http://www.naic.org/documents/topics_fed_and_basel_3.pdf; see also, Elizabeth Festa, With IAIS in
Town, Focus is on Avoiding Bank-centric Standards, LIFEHEATHPRO (Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.lifeh
ealthpro.com/2012/10/04/with-iais-in-town-focus-is-on-avoiding-bank-centri; Examining the Impact of
Proposed Rules to Implement Basel III Capital Standards: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Ins.,
Hous. and Cmty. Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs, 112th Cong. 2–3 (Nov. 29, 2012)
(statement of Kevin M. McCarty, President of NAIC, and Commissioner of the Florida Office of
Insurance Regulation); Fed. Advisory Board on Ins., Meeting Minutes (Nov. 14, 2012) at 8, available at
http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Documents/11-14%20faci%20min%20fi
n.pdf [hereinafter FACI Nov. 2012 Meeting].
197. See DODD–FRANK ACT, supra note 12; 12 U.S.C. §§ 5321(b)(1)–(2).
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. Links to FSB members, FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD,
http://www.financialstabilityboard.org/members/links.htm (last visited May 17, 2013) [hereinafter FSB
Membership].
201. Elizabeth Festa, With IAIS in Town, Focus is on Avoiding Bank-centric Standards,
LIFEHEALTHPRO (Oct. 4, 2012), http://www.lifehealthpro.com/2012/10/04/with-iais-in-town-focus-ison-avoiding-bank-centri.
202. FSB Membership, supra note 200.
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representative from the Treasury Department or through FIO’s influence
on the IAIS, in which FIO is a member. Thus, FIO can only indirectly
affect the domestic and international determinations about which
insurance companies pose systemic risks.
IV. FIO STUDY ON MODERNIZING INSURANCE REGULATION
The final task that the Dodd–Frank Act assigned to FIO was to
produce a report on what the United States should do to modernize
insurance regulation within the United States.203 This report was due in
January of 2012. In March 2013, FIO’s Director claimed that FIO
would finally release its modernization report by July of 2013, which
would be eighteen months late. FIO’s Director made his comment in
the wake of criticism from the House Financial Services Committee. On
February 15, 2013, the House Financial Services Committee in its
Oversight Plan had chided FIO for missing the deadline for this report
and three other reports required under the Dodd–Frank Act and urged
them to release them “without further delay.”204
The Dodd–Frank Act specified ten factors that the modernization
report should cover, including, among other things, systemic risk
regulation, consumer protection regulation, international regulation, the
level of uniformity of state insurance laws, and the need for federal
insurance regulation, as well as any other topics that the Director of FIO
deemed appropriate.205 Not surprisingly, members of the insurance
industry and the states are extremely interested in what
recommendations FIO will make in this report, particularly with regard
to whether the federal government should become more directly
involved in insurance regulation.
Given the limited scope of this Article, it is not possible to discuss
what recommendations FIO might make on all ten factors that Congress
would like it to address. As a result, this Article will focus on the issue
of whether FIO will recommend that Congress enact a law creating an
optional federal charter for insurance or should become more directly
involved in the regulation of insurance by other means, such as
mandating minimum uniform standards or laws in particular areas of
insurance. Under an optional federal charter for insurance, insurance
companies would have had the same option that banks now enjoy—the
right to be chartered or licensed either at the state or at the federal level.
The primary supporters of an optional federal charter were the American
203. DODD–FRANK ACT, supra note 12; 31 U.S.C. § 313.
204. H. COMM. ON FIN. SERVICES, 113TH CONG., OVERSIGHT PLAN 16 (Feb. 15, 2013), available
at http://financialservices.house.gov/about/oversight.htm [hereinafter OVERSIGHT PLAN].
205. Id.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol81/iss2/6

38

Brown: Will the Federal Insurance Office Improve Insurance Regulation?

2012]

INSURANCE REGULATION

589

Council of Life Insurance (ACLI), the American Bankers Insurance
Association (ABIA), and the American Insurance Association (AIA),
which had been lobbying Congress to enact a federal insurance charter
scheme since 2001.206
Financial conglomerates with significant
businesses in the banking area, which predisposes them to favor the duel
banking system over the state-based insurance regulatory regime, have
substantial influence within the ACLI, ABIA, and AIA.
Several factors will influence the ultimate recommendations made by
FIO, including the current staff and advisors to FIO, the comments
received in response to the notice seeking public input on how the
United States should modernize its insurance regulations, and lobbying
of government officials by insurance firms and trade associations. Each
one of these will be analyzed in turn.
A. Employees and Advisors
Given the lack of any federal agency previously dealing with
insurance, it is not surprising that the majority of the officials and
advisors appointed to FIO and to the Federal Advisory Committee on
Insurance (FACI) come from industry or from state regulators. The
current Director for FIO is Michael T. McRaith, who previously served
as the Director for the Illinois Department of Insurance from 2005 to
2011.207 Before managing the Illinois Department of Insurance, he
worked as an attorney representing financial institutions, including
insurers, for fifteen years.208 During his first eighteen months in office,
Director McRaith has provided some indications of how he envisions
FIO’s role and the role of the federal government more generally in the
regulation of insurance. He has predominately focused on the ability of
FIO to represent the United States internationally, particularly with
regard to developing international standards for regulating systemically
important insurers and solvency standards.209
206. AM. BANKERS INS. ASS’N, COMPARISON OF OPTIONAL FEDERAL INSURANCE CHARTER
BILLS (Feb. 20, 2002), http://www.aba.com/ABIA/Pages/Issue_RM.aspx (click on the link “Comparison
of Optional Federal Charter Bills (3-1-02)” under the heading Testimony); ACLI Draft Proposal on
Federal Insurance Charter, LEBOEUF, LAMB, GREENE & MACRAE LLP (Apr. 20, 2001) (on file with
author); Comparison of ACLI, ABIA and AIA Federal Insurance Charter/Licensing Proposals,
LEBOEUF, LAMB, GREENE & MACRAE LLP (July 30, 2001) (on file with author).
207. Michael T. McRaith, Financial Stability Oversight Council, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury,
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/fsoc/about/council/Pages/michael_mcraith.aspx (last visited Apr.
30, 2013) [hereinafter MCRAITH BIOGRAPHY]; Kevin Lyons, Illinois Insurance Director Picked to Lead
New Federal Insurance Office, INSURANCEQUOTES.COM, http://www.insurancequotes.com/federalinsurance-office/; McRaith to Lead New Federal Insurance Office., INS. J. (Mar. 18, 2011),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2011/03/18/190630.htm.
208. MCRAITH BIOGRAPHY, supra note 207.
209. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, Written Testimony of Director of the Federal
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While Director McRaith has commented that the FIO report will
address issues regarding the possible abuses of captive insurers and
special purpose vehicles in reserving and risk transfer, he has not
indicated whether the report would support federal regulation to correct
such abuses.210 In addition, he has not made any specific comments
advocating federal regulation of insurance.
He has repeatedly
emphasized that “the states remain the primary regulators of the
insurance sector in the United States” and that “FIO is not a
regulator.”211 While he was the Illinois Insurance Director, however, he
was on record as opposing an optional federal charter.212 At that time,
he had predicted that an optional federal charter would not happen.213
While Director McRaith might not favor an optional federal charter, it
does not mean that he would be completely opposed to all forms of
federal regulation. For example, he might support the creation of a
National Association of Registered Agents and Brokers. In the past
three years, Senator John Tester (D-Montana), Senator Mike Johanns
(R-Nebraska), Representative Randy Neugebauer (R-Texas), and
Representative David Scott (D-Georgia) have revived the idea.214
Senators Tester and Johanns introduced into the Senate the National
Association of Registered Agents and Brokers Reform Act originally in
2012 and re-introduced it in 2013.215 Representatives Neugebauer and
Scott introduced a similar bill in the House, first in 2011 and then again
in 2013.216 NAIC supports the 2013 versions of these bills.217
Insurance Office Michael T. McRaith (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/pressreleases/Pages/tg1339.aspx; Press Release, U.S. Dept. of the Treasury, Remarks by Federal Insurance
Office Director Michael McRaith at Property/Casaulty Insurance Joint Forum (Jan. 10, 2012),
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg1393.aspx [hereinafter McRaith Remarks];
McRaith Testimony 2012, supra note 185.
210. Global Assoc. of Risk Professionals, Risk News & Resources, Debate Over Fed, State,
International Rules Intensifies, (Apr. 1, 2013), http://www.garp.org/risk-news-and-resources/riskheadlines/story.aspx?newsid=61078 [hereinafter GARP].
211. McRaith Testimony 2012, supra note 185; McRaith Remarks, supra note 209.
212. Laura Mazzuca Toops, Optional Federal Charter Won’t Happen, Illinois Top Regulator
Predicts, PROPERTYCASUALTY360.COM (Oct. 23, 2009),
http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2009/10/23/optional-federal-charter--wont-happen-ill-topregulator-predicts-.
213. Id.
214. Hall, supra note 37; GARP, supra note 210. Representative Scott was the first to attempt to
revive the NARAB concept as he introduced the National Association of Registered Agents and Brokers
Reform Act of 2008. See govTrack.com NARAB 2008, supra note 54.
215. National Association of Registered Agents and Brokers Reform Act of 2011, H.R. 1112,
112th Cong, 1st Sess. (Mar. 16, 2011), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr1112/
text; National Association of Registered Agents and Brokers Reform Act of 2013, H.R. 1155, 113th
Cong, 1st Sess., (Mar. 12, 2013), available at http:// http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/hr1064/
text.
216. National Association of Registered Agents and Brokers Reform Act of 2012, S. 2342, 112th
Cong, 2nd Sess., (Apr. 24,, 2012), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/s2342/text;
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Director McRaith’s views are not the only ones that are relevant.
FACI advises FIO in order to help FIO carry out its duties. The
members of FACI could provide input on what areas of insurance
regulation need to be modernized. As of April 2013, the members of
FACI include Christopher Mansfield, senior vice president and general
counsel of Liberty Mutual Group; John Degnan, senior advisor to the
CEO of the Chubb Corp. and the company’s former COO; Brian
Duperreault, president and CEO of the Marsh & McLennan Companies;
Loretta Fuller, CEO of Insurance Solutions Associates; Sean McGovern,
a director and general counsel of Lloyd’s North America; David “Birny”
Birnbaum, an economist and executive director of the Center for
Economic Justice; Michael E. Sproule, New York Life Insurance Co.
executive vice president and CFO; Scott E. Harrington, a professor in
the Health Care Management and Insurance and Risk Management
departments at the Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania;
Benjamin Lawsky, New York superintendent of Financial Services;
Thomas Leonardi, Connecticut insurance commissioner; Michael
Consedine, Pennsylvania insurance commissioner; Jacqueline
Cunningham, Virginia insurance commissioner; William White, District
of Columbia insurance commissioner; Monica Lindeen, Montana
commissioner of Securities and Insurance and state auditor; and Scott
Kipper, Nevada insurance commissioner.218
Given the membership of FACI, it is unlikely that it will advocate
significant changes to the insurance regulatory structure, such as the
creation of an optional federal charter for insurance. Seven of the
fifteen members are from state regulators, who generally are opposed to
any federal efforts to regulate insurance. Six of the fifteen are industry
representatives, who tend to have more mixed views on whether a
federal charter would be beneficial.219 Only one representative, Birny
Birnbaum, represents the interests of consumers and only one
representative, Scott Harrington, is an academic.220
National Association of Registered Agents and Brokers Reform Act of 2013, S. 534, 113th Cong, 1st
Sess., (Mar. 12, 2013), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/113/s534/text. In the 112th
Congress, the House passed the 2011 version but the Senate failed to pass its version and so the bill
died, which is why the bills had to be re-introduced in the 113th Congress. Hall, supra note 37.
217. Press Release: NAIC Testifies Before Congress in Support of Streamlined Producer
Licensing Legislation, NAT’L ASSOC. INS. COM. & CTR. FOR INS. POLICY AND RESEARCH (Mar. 19,
2013),
http://www.naic.org/Releases/2013_docs/naic_testifies_before_congress_in_support_streamlined_produ
cer_licensing.htm.
218. FACI Members, U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/pages/faci_members.aspx (last visited
May 17, 2013).
219. See id.
220. Id.
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Only two of the fifteen members of FACI, Scott Harrington and Sean
McGovern, submitted comments in response to FIO’s request for
comments as FIO began work on its modernization report.221 Sean
McGovern of Lloyd’s did not indicate in his comment letter whether
Lloyd’s or he favored an optional federal charter.222 Prior to his
appointment to FACI, Sean McGovern had stated that Lloyd’s was not
“pushing for a federal charter.”223 Dr. Harrington in his comment letter
does not argue for the creation of an optional federal charter for
insurance.224 Instead, he points out that the states did a reasonable job of
regulating the insurance industry during the financial crisis, that an
optional federal charter regime would entail large costs for uncertain
benefits, and would increase the likelihood of the federal government
bailing out too big to fail insurance companies in the future.225 These
views are consistent with his prior writings on the subject. Prior to his
appointment on FACI, Scott Harrington, published two articles that
advocated a conservative approach to any regulatory changes, arguing
that the differences between banking and insurance, the relatively low
systemic risks posed by insurance, and the strong market discipline in
the area of insurance cautioned against any major changes in insurance
regulation.226
In addition, while Christopher Mansfield of Liberty Mutual did not
submit a comment letter, Paul Mattera, the Senior Vice President and
Chief Public Affairs Officer of Liberty Mutual, did.227 It is likely that
Mr. Mansfield’s views on an optional federal charter do not differ
greatly from those of his firm. Paul Mattera in the comment letter that
he wrote on behalf of Liberty Mutual did support the creation of an
optional federal charter system, although he warned against “dual
regulation where financial and market regulation are divided.”228
221. Scott Harrington, Response to Request for Public Input on the Report to Congress on How to
Modernize and Improve the System of Insurance Regulation in the United States (Dec. 19, 2011)
[hereinafter Harrington Response]; Sean McGovern, Response to Request for Public Input on the Report
to Congress on How to Modernize and Improve the System of Insurance Regulation in the United States
(Dec. 16, 2011).
222. McGovern, supra note 221.
223. Charles E. Boyle, Lloyd’s New Director of North America, McGovern, Navigates Turbulent
Waters, INS. J. (Nov. 14, 2010),
http://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/features/2010/11/14/160489.htm.
224. Harrington Response, supra note 221, at 3–4.
225. Id.
226. Scott E. Harrington, The Financial Crisis, Systemic Risk, and the Future of Insurance
Regulation, 76 J. RISK & INS. 785 (2009); Scott E. Harrington, Insurance Regulation and the Dodd–
Frank
Act
(Networks
Fin.
Inst.,
Working
Paper,
2011),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1783904.
227. Paul Mattera, Response to Request for Public Input on the Report to Congress on How to
Modernize and Improve the System of Insurance Regulation in the United States (Dec. 16, 2011).
228. Id. at 2.
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Two of the four other industry representatives on FACI have publicly
stated views on whether an optional federal charter would be desirable.
Brian Duperreault of Marsh & McLennan Companies commented in
2010 that he no longer supported an optional federal charter for
insurance as it would just add one more regulator to the existing 50 state
regulators and probably would not promote efficiency.229 John Degnan
of Chubb Corp., however, has voiced his support for an optional federal
charter in the past and has not made any public statements that indicate
that he has changed his mind. In 2009, Mr. Degnan stated, “Our
industry would operate much more efficiently without the constant
changes to products, prices and practices foisted upon us by 50
separate state legislatures and 50 regulators,”230 In addition, while
Michael Sproule has not personally made any public statements
regarding an optional federal charter, his firm, New York Life Insurance
Co., was one of 135 companies that formed the Optional Federal Charter
Coalition to lobby for an optional federal charter prior to the financial
crisis.231
The sole consumer representative on FACI, Birny Birnbaum, also
opposes an optional federal charter for insurance because most
proposals advocating such a charter prior to the financial crisis favored
deregulation and were “very anti-consumer.”232 He, however, was not
opposed to all federal regulatory schemes for insurance but he had not
seen one proposed that would offer consumers better protections than
what they were getting from the states.233
Thus, only three members or their organizations are on record as
supporting a federal charter and ten are generally opposed to the idea.
As a result, it seems unlikely, given that most of the members of FACI
are opposed to an optional federal charter, that FACI would be
advocating for FIO to recommend the creation of an optional federal
charter.
Opposition to creating a federal charter regime does not mean that the
members of FACI are opposed to all forms of federal regulation. Some
229. Mark
E.
Ruquet,
Will
More
Regulation
Solve
Every
Problem?,
PROPERTYCASAULTY360.COM (May 17, 2010), http://m.propertycasualty360.com/2010/05/17/willmore-regulation.
230. Bill Keneally, Regulatory Issues Impel Advance on the Hill, INS. NETWORKING NEWS (Jan.
1, 2009),
http://www.insurancenetworking.com/issues/2008_57/insurance_financial_services_meltdown_legislati
on_regulations11653-1.html?pg=2.
231. Stanford Group Company, Insurance Regulation Reform: The Optional Federal Charter,
WASHINGTON FINANCIAL SERVICES BULLETIN (June 27, 2007), http://www.bipac.net/afc/FINS0627_o
fc.pdf.
232. Consumer Advocates Wary of Federal Insurance Regulation Plans, INS. J. Apr. 16, 2009,
http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2009/04/16/99590.htm.
233. Id.
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comments and actions taken by FACI in the past year indicate that it
might favor some instances of federal regulation.
In its inaugural meeting on March 30, 2012, FACI created two
subcommittees: one, Subcommittee I, to focus on the impact of national
and international demographic and socio-economic developments “on
affordability, accessibility and capacity,” and another, Subcommittee II,
to focus on “the key principles, objectives or concerns that promote the
supervisory balance essential to insurance firms looking to expand into
an emerging market” and the effect of national and international
demographic and socio-economic developments on those principles.234
FACI created a third subcommittee, Subcommittee III, at its Aug. 6,
2012 meeting to focus on the development of international standards.235
In the Nov. 2012 meeting of FACI, John Degnan commented that the
release of the FIO report on insurance modernization would help the
subcommittees do their work.236 In addition in the Nov. 2012 meeting,
some members of FACI Subcommittee II commented that the lack of a
federal regulator hampered the competitiveness of U.S. firms operating
outside of the United States.237 FACI decided to delegate an
examination of whether the U.S. state-based system harmed U.S. firms’
competitiveness to Subcommittee III.238 FACI also debated at its Nov.
2012 meeting whether a single solvency standard was appropriate and
expressed doubts that it was possible to create such a standard within the
United States given federalism and the fact that all states do not accept
NAIC recommendations.239
The proposed 2014 budget released by the Office of Management and
Budget in April 2013 contains language that suggests FIO may be
positioning itself to take on some form of regulatory role in the future.
The budget contained a section entitled, “Streamlined Insurance Sector
Regulation”, which discussed FIO’s activities.240 It also stated, “The
FIO was created, in part, to streamline what is currently a decentralized
234. Fed. Advisory Board on Ins., Meeting Minutes (Mar. 30, 2012) at 2–3,
http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizational-structure/offices/Pages/Federal-Insurance.aspx
(follow
link for “Committees/Board/Commissions”, click on pdf for Mar. 30, 2012 Minutes); Fed. Advisory
Board on Ins., Meeting Minutes (Aug. 6, 2012) at 4–6, http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizationalstructure/offices/Pages/Federal-Insurance.aspx (follow link for “Committees/Board/Commissions”,
click on pdf for Aug. 6, 2012 Minutes) [hereinafter FACI Aug. 2012 Meeting]; FACI Nov. 2012
Meeting, supra note 195, at 7–12.
235. FACI Aug. 2012 Meeting, supra note 234, at 6.
236. FACI Nov. 2012 Meeting, supra note 196, at 8.
237. Id. at 10.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Office of Management and Budget, Fiscal Year 2014 Analytical Perspectives Budget of the
U.S.
Government
(U.S.
Govt.
Printing
Office:
2013),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2014/assets/spec.pdf.
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regulatory regime.”241
The language from the proposed 2014 budget and the comments at
the Nov. 2012 FACI meeting indicate that FIO may be considering some
types of federal regulation, particularly in the area of solvency
regulation. Creating an optional federal charter, however, would not be
necessary to achieve a federal standard for solvency regulation. As
previously noted, the federal government through a treaty or
international agreement could mandate that the states require insurance
companies meet certain uniform capital adequacy standards.242 It is
worth noting that in none of the publicly released minutes do members
of FACI make specific recommendations as to what positions FIO
should take in its modernization of insurance regulation report.
B. Comments
On October 17, 2011, FIO published a notice seeking public input on
how to modernize insurance regulation in the United States for its report
on the topic, which was required by the Dodd–Frank Act.243 FIO only
received 144 comments, which is a far cry from the more than 17,000
comments that were submitted on the Volker Rule.244 Not surprisingly,
only thirty comments came from the general public and the remainder of
the comments came from either insurance or other financial services
businesses or from industry or consumer associations.245 Comments
from the financial services firms, the industry associations, and
consumer groups tended to be more detailed and more thoughtful than
those provided by individuals. A few of the comments from businesses
seemed designed to sell FIO some sort of technology to help it with its
general operations rather than addressing the issues raised in the Federal
Registrar notice. Some of the comments from insurance agents or
insurance agents’ associations seemed to have been based on a standard
or model comment letter as they contained similar language and covered
the same range of issues.
A majority of the comments addressed the issue of whether the

241. Id. at 27.
242. See discussion infra accompanying notes 175–84.
243. Public Input on the Report to Congress on How to Modernize and Improve the System of
Insurance Regulation in the United States, 76 Fed. Reg. 64174 (Oct. 17, 2011).
244. Phil Mattingly, Volume of Volcker Rule Comments Was No Surprise, Regulators Say,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 13, 2012), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-0313/volume-of-volcker-rule-comments-was-no-surprise-regulators-say.
245. The comments may be accessed via the Federal Insurance Office’s webpage on the U.S.
Department of the Treasury’s site. U.S. Department of the Treasury, Federal Insurance Office, About,
Organizational
Structure,
Resources,
http://www.treasury.gov/about/organizationalstructure/offices/Pages/Federal-Insurance.aspx (follow “Electronic Comments” link).
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federal government should be involved in some aspect of insurance
regulation, and a significant number of those comments specifically
discussed whether the United States should create an optional federal
charter for insurance. Sixty-two comment letters directly address the
issue of an optional federal charter. Of those comments, forty-one
opposed the idea, three expressed neutral views on the matter, and
eighteen supported the idea.
Those most vested in the current structure, such as state insurance
regulators or state groups of insurance agents, comprised the bulk of
comments against the optional federal charter proposal. State regulators
will lose some of their power and revenue if companies are allowed to
choose whether they will be regulated by state or federal regulators.
Insurance agents will lose because they will face increased competition
as the barriers of entry into their marketplaces will be lower.
C. Lobbying of Government Officials
The insurance industry has never been one to skimp on spending for
lobbying.246 The insurance industry spent more on lobbying between
1998 and 2012 than any other part of the financial services and real
estate sector.247 The insurance industry spent over $159 million in 2011,
or one-third of the over $482 million total that the finance, insurance,
and real estate sector spent.248 The preliminary numbers spent on
lobbying for 2012 indicate that the amounts spent by the insurance
industry declined slightly to about $151.7 million, although the amounts
spent by the entire finance, insurance, and real estate sector rose to about
$482.2 million.249 The 2012 numbers may be revised in the future. The
amount of lobbying that the finance, insurance, and real estate sector has
engaged in over the past fourteen years has more than doubled, from
about $207.9 million in 1998 to about $482.2 million in 2012.250

246. See Lobbying: Top Industries (2012), CENTER RESPONSIVE POL. (2012),
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/top.php?indexType=i (last visited Mar. 18, 2013).
247. Lobbying: Finance, Insurance & Real Estate Statistics (1998–2012), CENTER RESPONSIVE
POL,
(data
chart
from
1998–2012
on
file
with
author),
available
at
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/index.php (online database used to access years data from years
1998–2012).
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
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Fig. 2: Annual Amounts Spent on Lobbying by Insurance Industry
and the Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate Sector251
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While the records of the Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve,
the FDIC, the SEC, and the CFTC show which representatives of NAIC,
other insurance associations, and insurance firms met with the highest
ranking officials in each agency to discuss the regulations that they are
responsible for developing under the Dodd–Frank Act, these agencies’
records do not go down to the office level. As a result, no public
information exists about the people or groups who met with FIO
Director McRaith or his staff. Given that FIO is responsible for the
report, the most effective lobbying would have been done through
meetings with FIO Director McRaith and the other officials within FIO.
More senior government officials generally would not involve
themselves in the details of the report, although they might influence
some of the general principles behind the recommendations. As a result,
it is difficult to determine if proponents or opponents of an optional

251. Id.
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federal charter scheme have lobbied FIO the most.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The Dodd–Frank Act gives the federal government the tools to make
progress on uniform, international insurance prudential standards as well
as standards for regulating SIFIs that would cover the largest insurance
groups. It is doubtful, however, that the Treasury Department and
USTR will be seeking to negotiate any binding international agreements
on insurance prudential standards in the next few years. As a result, FIO
represents only incremental progress on the international standards
front.
In the Dodd–Frank Act, Congress refused to make any major changes
to domestic insurance regulation and instead, attempted to mollify
public concerns about insurance regulation by requesting FIO to study
the matter and report back to Congress with recommendations. FIO,
however, faces strong pressures from state regulators, Republican
members of Congress who oppose further expansions of federal powers,
and some members of the insurance industry who benefit from the
current state-based system, to not significantly change the current
regulatory structure for insurance.
Even if FIO were to recommend significant changes to insurance
regulation such as creating an optional federal charter, FIO lacks the
power to implement them. Such changes would require Congress to
enact the appropriate legislation to do so. In the current political
climate, which is dominated by concerns about the national debt,
Congress does not consider making substantial changes to insurance
regulation a priority. For example, the Oversight Plan for the House
Committee on Financial Services does not mention insurance regulatory
changes until page 16 of the 23 page plan.252
FIO also might be concerned about damaging its relationships with
the state insurance regulators and certain parts of the insurance industry
if it recommends significant levels of federal regulation. Such forces
could use their lobbying power to persuade Congress to limit FIO’s
budget and undermine its ability to perform the functions assigned to it
by the Dodd–Frank Act.253
Given these factors, FIO’s report will likely adopt a conservative

252. OVERSIGHT PLAN, supra note 204, at 16.
253. Something similar happened to the SEC in the 1990s. At that time, industry groups
persuaded Congress to restrict the SEC’s budget, which hampered the agency’s ability to enforce the
securities laws and discouraged it from implementing more stringent investor protections. Elizabeth F.
Brown, E Pluribus Unum—Out of Many, One: Why the United States Needs a Single Financial Services
Agency, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. R. 1, 51 (2005).
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approach that advocates incremental changes. Nevertheless, by giving
the federal government the power to negotiate international agreements
on insurance prudential standards and by creating FIO, the Dodd–Frank
Act has established mechanisms to put constant pressure on state
insurance regulators to improve both domestic and international
insurance regulatory standards.
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